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Since the Congress of Berlin modern economic imperialism 
has been definitely recognized as the dominant factor in in­
ternational relations. No longer does it appear as the old 
colonialism of the mercantilists but now, transformed by the 
Industrial and Commercial revolutions, it has become "the 
process of discovering foreign market, of establishing perma­
nent foreign economic interests, and of exercising political 
pressure upon the regions in which the economic interests 
exist."1 Economic penetration, commercial treaty, protect­
orate, and annexation are the keywords of imperialisms new 
program. Although its chief exponents are still to be found 
in Europe, imperialism is not a sectional movement. It is, 
instead, a stage which results when a highly developed 
economic organization piles up a surplus and forces manufac­
turers and capitalists to look for new markets and for new 
investments. This economic condition was first evident in 
European states. 
In the post Civil War period the United States was reach­
1. Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy; a Study 
in American Imperialism (New York, 1925), p. XV of Intro -
duction. Carlton J. H. Hayes in A Political and Social 
History of Modem Europe (New York, 1931), Vol. II, p. 601, 
describes imperialism as "the quest for profitable invest­
ments for capital, rather than of farms and new homes for 
settlers,'1 while J. A. Hobson, quoted in Dollar Diplomacy, 
p. XV, says that it "implies the use of the machinery of 
government by private interests, mainly capitalist, to se­
cure for them economic gains outside their country." 
2 
ing the stage which is a forerunner of foreign economic 
imperialism. Her population rose from 51,443,321 in 1860 
to 62,622,250 in 1890.2 A large percentage moved to the 
cities during this period and the number of cities over 
10,000 more than trebled.3 At the same time the number of 
farms more than doubled.^ The Homestead Act made Western 
land available to any one who would live on it and the fron­
tier which in 1860 extended through central Minnesota south­
ward, "bulging beyond the 97th meridian in portions of Kansas 
and Texas," was practically gone by 1890. An important 
factor in the rapid settlement of the West was the extension 
of the railway system. A bill for the building of the Union 
Pacific and the Central Pacific which were to unite to form 
the first transcontinental railroad, was approved in 1862 and 
after this time railway construction advanced rapidly, reach-
2. Census Reports, 1860, Population, p. 597; Abstract of the 
Eleventh Census, 1890, p. 5. 
3. Census Reports ,* 1860, Mortality and Miscellaneous Statis­
tics, Introduction, p. XVIII-XIX; Abstract of the Eleventh 
Census, 1890, pp. 25-50. Causes given by Walter Wilson 
Jennings, A History of Economic Progress in the United 
States (New York, 1926), p. 589, are growth of manufactur-
ing, advance in ease of transportation, increase in 
wealth, good wages, regular employment, opportunities for 
self-feetterment, and companionship. 
4. Abstract of the Eleventh Census, 1890, p. 60, number of 
farms in 1860 were 2,044,077 while in 1890, the number was 
4,564,641. 
5. Isaac Lippineott, Economic Development of the United States 
(New York, 1921), p. 308; Frederick Jackson Turner, The 
Frontier in American History (New York, 1920). 
3. 
g 
ing a total of 165,562 miles in 1890. Likewise, the high 
prices of farm products, the labor surplus following the 
Civil War, the development of mining in several Western 
states, and the influx of immigrants in the last were 
instrumental in causing the disappearance of the frontier. 
The introduction of farm machinery, the improvement in 
methods of grain transportation, and specialization in agri­
culture resulted in a great increase in the output of 
cereals. In the period between 1860 and 1890, production of 
wheat mounted from 173,104,924 to 468,373,968 bushels; pro­
duction of corn from 838,792,742 to 2,122,327,547 bushels; 
production of oats from 172,643,185 to 809,250,666 bushels; 
and production of barley from 15,825,898 to 78,332,976 
7 bushels. By 1875 American wheat was beginning to influence 
the world market, and by 1880 an era of depression had set 
in in French, British, and German agriculture, partly due to 
8 the low prices brought about by this new competition. In 
an effort to offset .American and Russian competition at a 
6. Census Report, 1860, Mortality and Miscellaneous Statis-
tlcs, Introduction, p. XIII, total miles of railroad in 
1860 were 30,793.67. Abstract of the Eleventh Census, 
1890, p. 218, number of miles of railroad in 1890 was 
163,562.12. 
7. Lippincott, op.cit., p. 398. Charles Austin Beard and Mary 
R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York, 
1927), p. 274, believes this specialization to be due to 
the increased use of machinery, "the stimulus of business 
enterprise, and the pressure of competition." 
8. Melvin M. Knight, Harry Elmer Barnes, and Felix Flugel, 
Economic History of Europe (New York, 1928), p. 441. 
4. 
time when cost prices were rising, Germany enacted the 
Tariff Law of 1879. As the decline in prices of cereals 
continued in Germany, the duties on foodstuffs—mainly meat 
and grain—were increased in 1885 and again in 1887. France, 
too, during this period set out to develop a more general 
system of protection for her farmers. Her efforts resulted 
in the Tariff of 1892.9 As a result of the growth of protec­
tion in Europe and the constantly increasing agricultural 
surplus, by 1890 the American farmer was forced to look for 
other markets. 
Industry, intrenched behind high tariff walls, with a 
broad domestic market, immense natural resources cheaply se­
cured, and a plentiful supply of cheap labor coming from 
Europe, was able to make gigantic strides during this period. 
The number of manufacturing establishments increased from 
140,433 in 1860 to 322,638 in 1890 and the annual value of 
manufactured products at the same time rose from $1,885,861,676 
10 
to $9,056,764,996. Up until 1880 the domestic market was 
great enough to absorb all manufactures, only fourteen per 
cent of the total exports being manufactured goods in that 
year. However, in order to keep invested capital employed at 
9. Frederick Austin Ogg, Economic Development of Modern 
Europe (New York, 1917), pp. 161-166, 195, 205, 303-311. 
10. Eighth Census, 1860, Manufacturing, p. 729; Abstract of 
the Eleventh Census, 1890, p. 109. 
5 
the point of most economical production, it was necessary 
to find a sale for all it could produce and this fact com­
pelled American manufacturers to keep searching for greater 
markets for their trade.11 The emphasis in the makeup of 
American exports shifted from raw materials to manufactured 
products after 1880 and from that time the importance of 
Europe as a market began to decline. After 1885, commerce 
with North America, South America, Asia, and Oceania commenced 
to mount. 
As a result of the quickening of industry capital accumu­
lated rapidly. The wealth of the United States had more than 
quadrupled between 1860 and 1890, and had increased one-third 
12 
between 1880 and 1890. As the wealth increased, it tended 
to become concentrated in the hands of a few. By 1890 it was 
13 
held as follows: 
11. Banker*s Trust Company, Our United States, quoted in 
Nearing and Freeman, op. cit., p. 24^51 
12. Eighth Census. 1860, Mortality and Miscellaneous Statis­
tics, p. 295; Abstract of the Eleventh Census, 1890, 
p. 189. 
1890—$65,037,091,197 
1880 §43,642,000,000 
I860 #16,159,616,068 
13. Richard Franklin Pettigrew, Triumphant Plutocracy, the Story 
of American Public Life from 1870 to 1920 (New York, 1921). 
p. 122. 
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During the post war period this capitalist class had in­
vested their money chiefly in American industries "but by 
the end of the nineteenth century they were ready for invest 
14 ment abroad. They had reached the stage which in Europe 
had forced investors into Africa and Asia. 
Since 1844 when Caleb Cushing had been sent to open 
China, the foreign policy of the United States had been in­
creasingly concerned with the promotion of her trade abroad. 
As a result, when the shift from export of raw materials to 
the export of manufactured goods made it necessary for Ameri 
can manufacturers to turn from Europe as a market to the 
undeveloped countries which had need for such products, they 
14. Beard, op. cit., Yol. II, p. 197. 
7 
called upon the government of the United States for help. 
At the same time .American capitalists were finding govern­
ment support essential in their attempted economic domina­
tion of foreign territories and were beginning to exert a 
growing pressure for the expansion of the commercial empire 
of the United States through the political domination of 
territory in the form of spheres of influence, protectorates, 
and dependencies. Although the most of the United States and 
Alaska had been acquired by the American government since 
1800 and attempts had been made to obtain Cuba, San Domingo, 
Haiti and the Danish West Indies, the annexation of foreign 
territory for the reasons urged by the imerican imperialists 
represented a distinct departure in foreign policy. We find 
therefore, that by 1890 the United States was arriving at the 
stage recognized by Europeans at the time of the Congress of 
Berlin. Economic penetration of backward countries had al­
ready begun and the stage was set for territorial acquisi­
tion, the political phase of imperialism. 
As early as 1873 Hamilton Fish, then Secretary of State, 
showed his understanding of the importance of Hawaii as a 
source for raw material, a field for American investment, and 
"a'resting spot in the mid-ocean, between the Pacific Coast 
and the-vast domains of Asia, which are now opening to com-
15 
merce and Christian civilization." Americans had been in­
15. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52nd Cong., 2d Sess. 
8 
terested in Hawaii since these Islands were discovered by-
Captain Cook, an English navigator, on one of his exploring 
1 fi 
voyages in the North Pacific. On his last voyage Captain 
Cook had learned the value of the fur trade between China 
and the Northwest coast of America and it was this trade 
that first made the Islands well-known and gave them a place 
of importance in the commercial world. In 1786, Joseph 
Barrell, a Boston merchant, formed a stock company with a 
capital of #50,000 for trade in furs, sandalwood, cocoanut 
oil and other products of the Pacific islands the the Alaskan 
and Oregon coasts. Two vessels, the Columbia, commanded by 
Captain Bobert Gray, and the Lady Washington, commanded by 
Captain John Kendrick, left Boston in 1787 and were the first 
17 
American ships to visit Hawaii. During the same winter 
there came to the Islands the Eleanora and the Fair American 
commanded by Captain Simon Metcalfe and his son who had been 
trading for furs on the American coast. To punish the 
natives for stealing a boat and putting to death the sailor 
in it, Captain Metcalfe fired upon a large number who came 
out to trade, killing more than one hundred. A few days 
later a chief retaliated by killing all of the men on the 
16. This was possibly a rediscovery as there is some evidence 
to show that Juan Gaetano, a Spanish navigator, dis­
covered them in 1555. If so, he made no effort to benefit 
from his discovery. 
17. Edmund Janes Carpenter, America in Hawaii, a History of 
United States Influence In the Hawaiian Islands (Boston. 
1899), pp. 29-31. 
9. 
Fair American except Isaac Davis who escaped alive. Davis 
and John Young, the boatswain of the Ileanora, also a cap­
tive, were taken under the protection of Kamehameha, who 
made them his advisers. They were instrumental in helping 
him to force the entire Archipelago to acknowledge him as 
18 
Kamehameha I, the first of the line of Hawaiian monarchs. 
It was in this period that Captain George Yancouver 
made his three visits to the Islands. The Nootka Sound con­
troversy which nearly involved Spain and England in war was 
adjusted when Spain yielded and signed the Nootka Convention 
at Madrid in 1790. Captain Yancouver was sent to receive the 
1Q 
restitution of the territory from Spain, and to explore. 
His winters were spent in the Sandwich Islands where he re­
ceived the cession of Hawaii to Great Britain for protection 
against enemies, with the understanding that the native 
religion, government, and social system should not be dis­
turbed. As this cession was not accepted by England nothing 
90 
resulted from it. 
The publication of accounts of these voyages familiarized 
sea-men with the Islands so that every ship in the Pacific 
began to stop there and Honolulu became a regular market for 
18. Carpenter, op. oit., pp. 11-16. 
19. Edmond S. Meany, Vancouver*s Discovery of Puget Sound, 
Portraits and Biographies of the Men Honored in the Naming 
of Geographic Features of Northwestern America (New York. 
1907), pp. 10-12. 
20. Ibid., p. 14. 
10 
supplies. Many fur-traders came to secure provisions, to 
obtain Hawaiians for sea-men, or to spend tlie winter 
dressing their furs and buying sandalwood. Among them were 
a large number of Americans and by 1816 they were so in­
fluential that their arguments caused the Hawaiian king to 
El 
expel the Russian American Fur Company from his country. 
The fur traders had discovered the value of the sandalwood 
in Hawaii and by 1810 it had became the predominant interest 
there. The importance of this trade was largely due to con­
ditions peculiar to the Islands. As the chiefs realized the 
demand for the wood they made it a government monopoly and 
forced the people to cut it, usually without compensation. 
Since it cost them practically nothing they were willing to 
pay for their purchases in lavish amounts of sandalwood. As 
the wood was easily sold in China where it was in demand for 
incense in joss houses, the fur trader found it to be a 
valuable asset in commerce. So many of these traders were 
from Boston that the Hawaiians usually spoke of imerica as 
21. The Russian American Fur Company, chartered by the Tsar 
of Russia, had secured a monopoly of the fur trade in 
Alaska and wished to establish trading posts in Califor­
nia and the Hawaiian Islands in order to get supplies. 
Their representative, Dr. Scheffer, whose actions were 
later repudiated by the directors of his company, 
attested to make a settlement in Hawaii and to get 
Kauai away from the control of Kamehameha. Ralph S. 
Kuykendall, A History of Hawaii Prepared Under the Direc­
tion of the Historical Commission of the Territory of 
Hawaii (Hew York, 1926). pp. 92-96. 
11. 
22 Boston and of the Americans as Bostonians. The outstand­
ing American engaged in this trade was John Jacob Astor 
of New York. Astor had been carrying on commerce with 
China for sixteen years when he discovered the possibilities 
of sandalwood in connection with his China trade. Part of 
his cargo from New York was usually exchanged for furs along 
the American coast and the remainder for sandalwood in 
Hawaii. Astor*s great resources enabled him to sell goods 
at very low prices on short credit, giving him an advantage 
over others who were often obliged to take notes payable in 
sandalwood. As his cargo was usually the first on the 
Canton market, he received good prices for it and bought 
teas, silks, nankeens, spices, etc. which he then bartered 
to the Hawaiian chiefs and to the Russians and Spaniards 
along the American coasts in return for sandalwood and furs. 
These were again sold in Canton and this time the Chinese 
cargo was usually taken back to New York. Astor was engaged 
in the selling of sandalwood during its best years, from 
1816 until 1828. Among other traders who dealt in sandalwood 
were Captain Kendrick, Captain William Cole, Captain Brewer, 
and Roquefeuil. As early as 1890 Kendrick's men began to 
22. The Indians of the Northwest usually called all Americans 
Bostonese for similar reasons. 
IE 
buy sandalwood and ship it to the Canton market. Much 
later, in February 1823, Captain William Cole came to the 
Sandwich Islands in the Paragon, owned by Josiah Marshall 
of Boston. They brought with them the frames of two 
schooners which were set up at Honolulu and used for gather­
ing sandalwood. John Dominis, second mate of the Paragon 
was destined to become the father-in-law of the Hawaiian 
Q,ueen Liliuokalani. Charles Brewer, another member of the 
Paragon* s crew later became master of a vessel and engaged 
in the Hawaiian trade, finally setting up a commercial house 
24 in the Islands. Roquefeuil was commander of an expedition 
sent out by M. Balguerie of Bordeaux with the object of 
getting goods for the China trade without the expenditure of 
money. This was in 1816, toward the end of the fur trade, 
and Roquefeiul had difficulty in getting a cargo of furs, 
OK 
so he began to buy sandalwood also. In 1821 and the first 
half of 1822, the exports of this product amounted to from 
#350,000 to #400,000 at $10 per picul while in the year 
1836 only $26,000 worth was sold at $7 per picul.26 This 
23. S. E. Morison, Maritime History of Massachusetts (Boston, 
1921), p. 51; George Vancouver, Voyage of Discovery 
(London, 1821), Vol. I, pp. 172-3. 
24. Carpenter, op. cit., pp. 37-39. 
25. Camille de Roquefeuil, A Voyage Round the 7/orld between 
the Years 1816-1819. in New Voyages and Travels (London, 
1821), Vol. XXX, pp. 3-63. 
26. One picul equals 133-1/3 pounds. 
13 
decline was due to the destruction of the sandalwood forests. 
No care was taken in securing wood for sale, the quality he-
came poor, and the price diminished. A decisive factor in 
their disappearance was the tax collection of 1827 enforced 
by the king and chiefs in an attempt to pay debts of |150,00G 
owed to Americans. MA tax of one half a picul of sandalwood 
or four dollars in money" which was levied "on every native 
of the Sandwich Islands," resulted in the ruin of the forests 
by the cutting of 25,000 more piculs of wood and left many 
27 
chiefs still in debt. It was at this time that Astor de­
cided to withdraw from the Pacific trade after twenty-eight 
28 
extremely successful years. 
During the period of the sandalwood trade many whale-
ships began to stop in the Islands for rest, repairs, and 
supplies. From forty to sixty American whale-ships were some­
times found at anchor at one time in Honolulu harbor in 1823. 
During the period between January 1, 1836 and the end of 
1841, four-fifths of the three hundred and fifty eight 
American vessels anchoring in Honolulu harbor were whalers, 
and each of these spent an average of seven hundred dollars 
29 
while on shore. The discovery of valuable whale fisheries 
27. Charles Brewer, Reminiscences (1884), pp. 27-31, quoted 
in Kenneth Wiggins Porter, John Jacob Astor, Business Man 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1931), Vol. II, p. 667. 
28. Porter, op. eit., Yol. II, pp. 640-647, 662-670, 1195-
1197. 
29. Carpenter, op. cit., p. 36. 
14. 
in the Okhotsk sea and in the Arctic ocean north of Bering 
strait gave an impetus to the industry which was at its 
height between 1840 and 1860. As Japan was closed to com­
merce the whaling vessels continued to come to Hawaii for 
supplies, an average of four hundred arriving each year. 
Most of the .American whale fishing had been transferred to 
the Pacific and a large majority of these ships were from 
the United States. The American promoters of this fishing 
discovered that a great saving in time and money could be 
made by storing the whale oil in Hawaii for trans-shipment in 
other vessels, and the Islands became more essential to the 
industry. The whale-ships at the same time contributed to 
Hawaiian economic life through import duties and port dues 
which helped the government treasury, by furnishing work for 
the merchants and mechanics, and by securing to the farmers 
a market for their meat and vegetables. In 1859 the dis­
covery of petroleum dealt a severe blow to whaling and the 
scarcity of whales together with the destruction of whaling-
vessels in the Civil War and in the ice pack of 1871, further 
30 
diminished its importance. 
In 1820 the American government considered her interests 
great enough to warrant the appointment of Mr. John C. Jones 
50. James M. Callahan, "Hawaii", The Encyclopedia Americana 
(New York, 1932). 
15 
to go to the Islands as the "Agent of the United States for 
commerce and seamen.Disturbances caused by deserting 
sailors together with the question of the sandalwood debts 
led to the sending of two American warships, the Dolphin 
and the Peacock, on a visit of friendly inspection in order 
to settle the disputes. After adjusting the conflicting 
claims, Captain Thomas Ap Catesby Jones, acting for the 
United States, made a treaty with the Hawaiian government 
providing for perpetual peace and friendship between the two 
countries and for the protection of American trade in the 
Islands. This was signed in December 1826, and although it 
was never ratified by the government of the United States, 
32 
the Hawaiians considered it as binding upon themselves. 
About the time of the beginning of the whaling industry 
American influence was strengthened by the coming of the 
missionaries. They arrived at an opportune moment for 
Kamehameha II had just overthrown idolatry and Hawaii was a 
country without a religion. This gave the American evangel­
ists an opportunity to intrench themselves strongly in 
Island life and politics. 
In 1809 Captain Brintnall had brought Ophuahaia 
(Obookiah), a Hawaiian boy, to New Haven, and it was his de­
sire for the Christianizing of his homeland that inspired 
31. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol.VIII, p. 4. 
32. Ibid., 31-33. 
16 
the sending of missionaries there. Obookiah was educated 
through the kindness of Americans and returned to his 
home as a missionary. The New England church became inter­
ested in the movement and in 1819 a band was organized in 
Boston and sent to Hawaii. Soon a chapel and a school-
house were built, the language was reduced to writing, and 
spelling books were printed for the people. The civilizing 
and Christianizing movement had begun. Eight years later, 
four hundred forty native teachers were helping the Ameri­
cans in their work and in 1836, thirty two additional 
33 missionaries were sent out. The missionaries soon became 
of prime importance to the chiefs and were their advisers 
on almost all questions. Because of their civil influence 
they were strongly opposed by Richard Gharleton, the British 
consul-general to Hawaii and the Society Islands. He saw 
that they were introducing republican principles which would 
draw the Islands closer to the United States and which he 
feared would eventually make them an appendage of that repub­
lic.34 
During the next decade foreign interests became so pre­
dominant in Hawaii that some people began to believe she 
would soon lose her independence. In 1836 while the guns of 
the Actaeon were commanding Honolulu, Charleton induced the 
33. Carpenter, op. elt., pp. 20-29. 
34. Ibid., 62. 
king to conclude a treaty with the British government 
providing for the protection of the persons and property 
of British subjects residing in the Islands. At the same 
time he used every opportunity to attempt to secure the 
intervention of the British government in Hawaiian affairs. 
France who in this period was posing as the defender of 
Catholic missionaries throughout the Pacific, now took ad­
vantage of the Hawaiian persecution of the Catholics as a 
pretext for interference in the government. Following the 
example of the English, Captain Laplace used the guns of 
j 
the frigate Artemise to force Kamehameha to sign two 
treaties, one providing for the safety of the Roman Catho­
lics and the other for a general treaty of friendship and 
55 commerce. Under these circumstances it seemed advisable 
to the king to obtain an acknowledgment and guarantee of 
Hawaiian independence from the three great powers, France, 
Great Britain, and the United States.36 
In December 1842, King Kamehameha III sent two commis­
sioners to Washington to call the attention of Secretary 
Webster, and through him, of the government of the United 
States, to the relations of the two countries and to suggest 
a definite recognition of the Hawaiian government as an 
35. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. VIII, 
pp. 33-35. 
36. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. VIII, 
p. 6. 
18. 
independent civilized power. The commissioners were suc­
cessful and in a few days Secretary Webster expressed the 
attitude of the State Department toward the acquisition of 
foreign territory saying that "the Government of the 
Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought 
either to take possession of the islands as a conquest, or 
for the purpose of colonization, and that no power ought to 
seek for any undue control over the existing government or 
any exclusive privileges or preferences in matters of com-
37 
merce." President Tyler made their mission the subject of 
a special message to the Senate on December 31, 1842, and 
upheld Secretary Webster's pronouncement which was the first 
public statement of the greater interest of the United States 
in Hawaii. He spoke in opposition to foreign control as 
follows:38 
"It can not but be in conformity with the inter­
est and wishes of the Government and the people of 
the United States that this community.. .should be 
respected and all its rights strictly and conscien­
tiously regarded.... Far remote from the dominions of 
European powers, its growth and prosperity as an in­
dependent state may yet be in a high degree useful to 
all whose trade is extended to those regions, while 
its near approach to this continent and the inter­
course which American vessels have with it—such 
vessels constituting five-sixths of all which annually 
visit it—could not but create dissatisfaction on the 
part of the United States at any attempt by another 
power, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to 
37. Sen. Hep. No. 681, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. Ill, 
Appendix 2, p. 67. 
38. Ibid, 63. 
19 
take possession of the islands, colonize them, and 
subvert the native government." 
The United States was soon given an opportunity to 
carry out her implied promise to protect the Islands. This 
was occasioned by the unfriendly visit of the British ship 
Carysfort on the pretext that the right of a British sub­
ject had been infringed. Threatening to use force, if nec­
essary, Lord George Paulet demanded what amounted to the 
cession of Hawaiian sovereignty to Great Britain. Seeing no 
other way out, King Kamehameha agreed, stipulating that it 
be subject to any arrangement that might be entered into by 
commissioners to be appointed to lay the matter before 
Queen Victoria. Lord George Paulet accepted the cession and 
raised the British flag over the Islands. At once the King 
sent a message to President Tyler asking him to use his in­
fluence to persuade the Queen to withdraw from Hawaii. It 
happened that before the Paulet affair took place, Mr. 
Webster, in view of the recent French aggressions and of the 
attitude of Charleton, had sent a note to Edward Everett, 
United States minister at London, calling his attention to 
Mr. Tyler's recognition of Hawaiian independence, and stating 
that the President "would exceedingly regret that suspicion 
of a sinister purpose of any kind on the part of the United 
States should prevent England and France from adopting the 
same pacific, just, and conservative course toward the govern­
ment and people of this remote but interesting group of 
20 
Islands."39 Mr. Everett replied that Lord Aberdeen had 
expressed the intention of Great Britain to recognize the 
independence of Hawaii. Furthermore the British govern­
ment had informed the French ambassador at London that 
England could not agree on any encroachments on the Sandwich 
Islands and the ambassador replied that none were contem­
plated by France. 
At this juncture the very emphatic protest of Secretary 
of State Legare was sent to Edward Everett and presented to 
the British government. Mr. Legare pointed out that the 
United States had no wish "to plant or to acquire colonies 
abroad" but that the peculiar relations between Hawaii and 
ourselves might make us "feel justified, consistently with 
our own principles, in interfering by force to prevent its 
falling into the hands of one of the great powers of Europe. 
The appeal of Mr. Legare and of the Hawaiian commissioners 
which Kamehameha sent to the Queen, was successful and the 
action of Lord Paulet was disavowed. Edward Everett in a 
dispatch to the State Department concerning the disavowal 
stated 
"Had intelligence been received here of Lord 
George Paulet*s occupation of them before her promise 
39. Carpenter, op.cit., p. 82; Sen.Ex.Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 
2d Sess., Vol. VIII, pp. 37-49. 
40* Sen. Bep. No. 681, 55th Cong. £d Sess., Vol.Ill, 
Appendix 2, p. 67. 
41. Ibid., p. 77. 
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was given to recognize them, England, I think, would 
not have given them up. As it is, an understanding 
between the great European powers, amounting, in 
effect if not in form, to a guaranty of their inde­
pendence, is likely to take place. This is the only 
state of things with which the United States could be 
content. As it will be brought about without involv­
ing us in any compacts with other powers...." 
In November, 1843, a convention was entered into between 
France and Great Britain, recognizing the independence of 
Hawaii.42 The Sandwich Islands were at last admitted to the 
category of civilized nations. 
American influence now tended to become predominant. For 
several years the United States had been trying to negotiate 
a treaty with Hawaii giving rights to her similar to those 
gained by France in 1839. She did not succeed until 1850. 
At this time the first fully completed treaty between the 
United States and Hawaii was proclaimed. It resembled the 
commercial treaties negotiated by the United States with other 
nations and was to remain in force except as modified by 
later conventions, until the annexation of Hawaii.43 American 
influence was increased when the French consul in 1849 sup­
ported by two warships, seized Honolulu and the French 
government refused to interfere. In self-defense the Hawaiian 
king signed a secret proclamation placing the Islands under 
42. Sen.Ex.Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. ¥111, 
pp. 41-65. 
43. Ibid., pp. 75-82. 
American protection.4'4 Mr. Webster immediately returned 
this document to the King and warned the American minister, 
Mr. Severance, not to allow any direct interference by the 
United States navy as it was the province of Congress to 
declare war. In an official communication inclosed at the 
same time, Mr. Webster stated that the United States would 
uphold Hawaii's independence in spite of the attempts of the 
great commercial powers of Europe to take the Islands. He 
pointed out that they were ten times nearer the United States 
than Europe and that five-sixths of their commerce was with 
this country. As a threat he added that the Navy Department 
would be ordered to keep a fleet in the Pacific sufficiently 
large as to protect the American and Hawaiian interests there 
Copies of this letter were sent to the French government and, 
unable to mistake its meaning, they quickly disclaimed any 
intention of alienating Hawaiian independence. 
After 1850 events in the United States were at work 
changing public sentiment toward Hawaii. The acquisition of 
Oregon Territory in 1846 and of California in the Mexican War 
had brought America nearer Hawaii and had increased the inter 
est in trade. The discovery of gold in California brought 
44. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. VIII, 
pp. 84-95; Sen. Rep. No. 681, 55th Cong. 3d Sess., 
Vol. Ill, Appendix 2, pp. 77-79. 
45. Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. VIII, 
pp. 95-97. 
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many people to the western coast and many of them became 
interested in expansion saying that "manifest destiny" re­
quired that the United States include all of North America 
and Hawaii. The Hawaiians now became alarmed. Bands of 
filibusters had been organized in California to conquer 
Mexico and perhaps Hawaii. In the Islands themselves an 
annexationist sentiment had grown up, resulting in political 
disturbances which King Kamehameha III feared were the fore­
runners of revolution. As a result, when petitions were 
presented him asking that a treaty of annexation to the 
United States be drawn up, he consented. This treaty, made 
for use in case of emergency, was never signed by Kamehameha 
as he died in 1854. Had he signed it, it would not have been 
approved by the President of the United States because of 
three clauses: one providing for #300,000 a year to be paid 
to the chiefs, one calling for payment of $75,000 yearly for 
ten years for educational purposes, and one providing for 
ACL 
the admission of Hawaii as a state. 
Before the decline of whaling another industry, sugar 
production, was coming to the front. As early as 1802 a 
Chinese had made sugar on the island of Lanaii. Since the 
46. Sen. Rep. Ho. 227, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. II, pp. 40-
41; also House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., 
Vol. XXVII, pp. 141-165. 
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soil and climate were adapted to the growing of sugar cane, 
cultivation on a small scale began. About 1830 when it be­
came evident that the sandalwood trade was gone, the chiefs 
started to develop the natural resources of the Islands. Up 
until this time the natives had been discouraged in industry 
by the land system and the absolute control of the chiefs 
over their labor. Foreigners could neither buy land nor rent 
it on favorable terms and it was not until 1839 that the first 
successful sugar plantation was established. At that time an 
American firm of Ladd and Company was granted a fifty year 
lease of a tract of land at Kola, Kauai with the right to hire 
4-7 natives, raise cane, and manufacture sugar. By 1840 the ex­
ports from January until September included sugar worth 
48 
$18,000 and syrup and molasses worth #73,000. During the 
next few years several plantations were started and when the 
settlement of California furnished a convenient market for 
Hawaii, it became evident that this was to be the big industry 
of the Islands. 
There were two handicaps in the trade with California. 
One of these was the competition of Philippine sugar and the 
other, the United States tariff placed on this import. Many 
of the planters were Americans and they desired annexation to 
the United States in order to avoid the payment of a tariff. 
47. Kuykendall, op.cit.. p. 201. 
48. Ibid., 140. 
The Hawaiian government believed that the same end could be 
secured by a reciprocity agreement. Practically all of the 
Hawaiian-American relations from this time until 1898 consist 
of the attempts of the sugar planters to secure and maintain 
a satisfactory market in the United States. Reciprocity 
agreements were proposed by the Hawaiian government as early 
as 1848 and 1852 but were unfavorably received in the United 
States. In 1855 a third reciprocity treaty was negotiated 
and although favored by President Pierce and Secretary of State 
49 Marcy, it failed to receive a two-thirds vote in the Senate. 
During the Civil War the question of a treaty was set aside 
by Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State. The need for reci­
procity was not so pressing as the sugar industry was exceed­
ingly prosperous and the amount of sugar exported by Hawaii 
rose from 1,500,000 pounds in 1860 to 15,000,000 in 1865. 
After the war prices dropped, a crisis came, and people began 
to discuss reciprocity again. With the consent of Mr. Seward 
a fourth treaty was drawn up, ratified by the Hawaiian govern­
ment, and approved by President Johnson. At this time there 
was some talk of annexation. King Kamehameha V was in poor 
health and had named no successor. Edward McCook, United 
States Minister Resident in Hawaii, wrote that if the American 
49. Sen• Rep. 227, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. II, pp. 45-48. 
50. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 225. 
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government, upon the King's death, would indicate any de­
sire to annex Hawaii, a plebiscite would show the residents 
of the Islands to be unanimously in favor of the move. Mr. 
McCook in this letter summarized the interests of America 
in the Islands as follows: 
"They are the resting place, supply depot, and 
reshipping point of all our American whaling fleet. 
"They are the sources from which the Pacific 
States receive all the sugars they consume. 
"The greater part of the agricultural, commer­
cial, and moneyed interests of the islands are in the 
hands of American citizens. 
"All vessels bound from our Pacific coast to China 
pass close to these shores."51 
He saw a menace to American interests in the attempt being 
made by the Hawaiian government to secure a commercial treaty 
with Japan, and in the English sympathies of the governing 
officials. The desirability of a lawful and peaceful annexa­
tion of the Islands, providing the natives were willing, was 
expressed by Secretary Seward in 1867. American sentiment, 
however, was unfavorable at this time as elections were 
approaching and the political parties, still concerned with 
economy and retrenchment, were unwilling to consider national 
extension. In 1870, the fourth reciprocity treaty which had 
been pending for three years, was rejected by the Senate. 
The condition of the sugar industry continued to grow 
worse causing a business depression as well. This was 
51. Sen. Ex. Doc. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. VIII, p. 135. 
52. Ibid., 135-146. 
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heightened "by the decline of whaling. As King Kamehameha 
was growing more feeble, Mr. Henry Peirce, new minister to 
the Islands, suggested in a letter to the president that 
the time for closer political union between the United 
States and Hawaii was drawing near. Although Mr. Grant 
considered this letter important enough to send to the 
55 Senate, that body took no action. Upon Kamehameha1s 
death, Lunalilo, by birth the highest of the chiefs, suc­
ceeded to the throne. The agitation for annexation was con­
tinued both by "many persons in the islands representing 
large interests and great wealth," and in Imerica by "those 
of influence and of wise foresight who see a future that must 
54 extend the jurisdiction and the limits of this nation...." 
The Hawaiian government, Mr. Peirce believed, would never 
propose annexation however much the people as a whole wished 
it. If the great interests of the country demanded annexa­
tion, the planters, merchants, and foreigners would probably 
induce the people to overthrow the government and establish 
a republic. This republic would then ask for admission into 
55 
the Union. 
The death of Lunalilo in 1874 made it necessary for the 
Hawaiian Legislature to choose a new king. One candidate 
53. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. VIII, 
pp. 12-16. 
54. Ibid., 15. 
55. Ibid., 149, 150. 
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for the throne, Kalakaua, was favored by most of the 
foreigners, especially the Americans, and "by a large number 
of the natives while the other, Queen Dowager Emma, widow 
of Kamehameha IT, was supported by English interests and 
by many Kanakas. Kalakaua was elected by a vote of thirty-
nine to six. This decision precipitated a riot among the 
followers of Queen Emma which was quelled only by marines 
landed from the British and American warships anchored in 
the harbor. Kalakaua favored closer relations with the 
United States and in the autumn of 1874, although opposed by 
the French and British commissioners, he set out on a visit 
to Washington. Success in obtaining a reciprocity treaty 
was hoped for by offering Pearl river harbor in exchange. 
This concession was not required, however, as an agreement 
passed Congress without it. The mew treaty, for which 
Hawaii had striven twenty-seven years, provided that unre­
fined sugar, rice, and other Hawaiian products should be ad­
mitted into the United States duty free; enumerated a list of 
American products to be admitted to Hawaii duty free, and 
stipulated that as long as it remained in force the Hawaiian 
king would not make any grants of territory or of special 
privileges to another power. After seven years the treaty 
could be ended by e ither party by giving one year* s 
56. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, 
pp. 285-288. 
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notice. The treaty was a "conspicuous exception" to the 
commercial policy of the United States at this time. The 
spread of manufacturing in the West had' strengthened the 
protectionist sentiment and in 1875 tariffs were being re­
stored to their war-time amounts. The cause which had finally 
brought the United States to sign the treaty was the growing 
trade of Hawaii with Australia, New Zealand, and British 
Columbia. The State Department had heard that the entire 
sugar crop of 1876-77 was to be sold to the British and it 
felt that unless the United States made some concessions, 
58 Hawaii would in time become an English colony. This was 
an action which the American government could not permit. 
Even the War Department had recently begun to show an interest 
in their future and in May, 1875, under confidential instruc­
tions from Secretary of War, W. W. Belknap, Admiral Schofield 
had made an investigation of the Sandwich Islands in order 
to ascertain the defensive possibilities of their ports, 
examine their commercial facilities, and collect all the in­
formation possible on other subjects win reference to which 
we ought to be informed in the event of a war with a powerful 
57. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. XXVII, 
pp. 405-409. 
58* Sen. Bep. No. 227, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. II, pp. 103-113 
and Congressional Record, Vol. 4, Part 2, 44th Cong. 
1st Sess., pp. 1420-1422. 
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maritime nation...." 
The results of the free admission of sugar into the 
United States were surprisingly far-reaching. The treaty 
not only advanced economic development in the Islands, but 
also changed their relations with the rest of the world, 
and led to their final loss of independence. In reality a 
customs union was formed including Hawaii and the United 
States. Reciprocity granted the equivalent of a bounty to 
the Hawaiian sugar planters for sugar remained the same 
price on the American market. Some objections were made by 
Great Britain and Germany, both claimed the same privileged 
treatment by Hawaii as was given to the United States by 
the treaty of 1875. Although England*s demands were backed 
by the "favored nation" clause in her treaty of 1852 with 
Hawaii, Secretary Blaine declared them "inadmissible" and 
the Hawaiian government backed him by upholding America*s 
right, according to the treaty, to exclusive privileges. 
Hawaii immediately became a field for very profitable 
investment of American capital and an extraordinary increase 
in sugar planting took place. In 1883 Consul Daggett sent a 
statement from the Saturday Press of Honolulu showing the 
59. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. VIII, 
pp. 150-155. 
60. Ibid., p. 16. 
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principal sugar plantations in Hawaii. Forty eight of the 
sixty nine plantations were owned "by Americans.OA The 
comparative valuations of sugar interests by nationalities 
were as follows: 
1 space = 1/2 million dollars 
American rxr-r-T i-rrm-n-rn-ri i i i i 
British czrr3=nzrn=n 
German •—r-i 
Hawaiian c=t> 
Chinese a, 
J. Seott in his REPORT UPON THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR THE YEAR 1877, gives 
us some interesting suggestions of the immediate effects of 
go 
the reciprocity treaty. The price of real estate, he tells 
us, advanced rapidly. In 1875 the assessed valuation of the 
real estate of the kingdom was $6,490,600. By 1876, "in 
anticipation of the ratification of the treaty," it had in­
creased to $7,624,061 and by 1877 it had mounted to 
$8,500,000. This increase was mostly in sugar and rice lands. 
61. Consular Report No. 36, Dec. 1885, pp. 396-398. 
Value of total sugar interests $15,886,800 
American $10,235,464 
British 3,180,050 
German 970,046 
Hawaiian 641,240 
Chinese 560,000 
62. Commercial Relations, 1877, pp. 622-632. 
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One half of the Lahaina plantation had recently sold for 
|500,000 when before the signing of the treaty the entire 
plantation would hare brought much less than that amount. 
Many new plantations were being established, most of the 
capital invested belonging either to American citizens or 
to Americans who had become naturalized citizens. Claus 
Spreckels was probably the leading example of capitalistic 
investment in Hawaiian sugar. A refiner in California, he 
opposed reciprocity until the treaty went into effeet and then 
took advantage of it to make another fortune. In 1884 he 
owned the majority of one plantation in Hawaii and had minority 
interests in four others. He, together with his friends, was 
at this time able to control one-fourth of the sugar crop. 
The sudden leap in sugar exports to the United States 
is shown in the following graph 
Sen. Rep. No. 227, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. II, p. 112. 
64. Sugar exports to the United States as follows: 
1870—14,557,711 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1870, p. 261. 
1871—18,135,500 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1872, p. 606. 
1878—38,399,862 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1878, p. 804. 
1880—63,427,972 lbs., Commercial Relations of the United 
States, 1880 and 1881, p. 1124. 
1883—114,107,155 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1882 and 1883, 
Vol. II, p. 837. 
Reports from the Consuls of the United States, No. 81, 
July, 1887, p. 88: 1886—216,223,615 lbs. (practically) 
33. 
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As all of the labor and land were absorbed by the sugar in­
dustry, it became necessary to import almost everything 
used in the Islands. The amount of imports from the United 
States increased rapidly during this period, making an im-
65 
mense jump "between. 1876 and 1883. 
.J 
J 4 
65. Hawaiian imports from the United States: 
1875—$947,260, Commercial Relations, 187 7, p. 626. 
1876—1771.407. Loc. cit. 
1877—J1,545,156, Loc. "cit. 
1878—§1,889,759, Commercial Relations, 1878, p. 802. 
1880—$2,671,823, Commercial Relations of the United 
States, 1880 and 1881, p. 1122. 
1881—#3,239,836, Loc. cit. (Cont. p. 35.) 
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The growth of the new merchant marine made up of vessels 
built expressly for the service, was encouraged by this 
shipping. American mercantile houses transacted the en­
tire commerce both ways and "by 1894 were carrying annually 
about $12,000,000 worth of merchandise at high rates. 
After 1883 the reciprocity agreement which had brought 
this increased prosperity became subject to termination at 
a year1s notice. Hawaiian sentiment ardently desired its 
extension for the progress of the Islands was dependent on 
the sugar industry which in turn depended on reciprocity. 
Many petitions for the abrogation of the treaty were sent to 
the Forty Seventh Congress by various American interests and 
a joint resolution providing for its termination was reported 
66 
from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The remarks 
of Representative Randall L. Gibson of Louisiana are probably 
typical. He attacked the treaty on two scores, first, that 
it had had no beneficial effect on our commerce, and second, 
that it had no political advantages for our country. He 
pointed out that at the time of the passage of the act the 
65. (Cont.) 
1882—#3,599,380, Commercial Relations, 1882 and 1883, 
Vol. II, p. 839. 
Data for 1883 from Consular Report No. 44, August 1844, 
p. 690. 
1883--#4,048,466 
Data for 1886 a computation based on statistics in 
Consular Report No. 81, p. 89. 
1886—$3,717,811. 
66. Cong. Rec., Vol. XIV, Part 2, 47th Cong. 2d Sess., p.1242. 
Secretary of Treasury had said that the increased exports 
to Hawaii would be equal to the duties surrendered on 
Hawaiian exports. This had not worked out, Mr. Gibson 
claimed as in 1881, for example, there was an increase of 
$2,072,609 in American exports over the 1875 record, while 
the duties surrendered amounted to $2,400,000, resulting in 
"an undisputed donation of that amount as a subsidy out of 
the Treasury of the United States to the sugar and rice 
art 
planters of Hawaii". This would soon break down every sugar 
refining industry in the East, West, and South and would be 
a great discouragement to the American planters. Further­
more, Mr. Gibson claimed, we gained no political advantage 
that we did not already have, therefore there was no advantage 
for us in reciprocity with Hawaii. Many others felt this way 
also and when the treaty was sent to the Senate it decided, 
in secret session, to stipulate the cession of Pearl Harbor 
for naval and commercial purposes. The convention had not 
yet been ratified when Mr. Cleveland became President. In 
his second annual message he committed himself in favor of 
the renewal of the convention for Hawaii had become practi­
cally an "outpost of American ccmmeree and a stepping stone 
68 to the growing trade of the Pacific." The renewal 
67. Gong. Rec., Vol. XIII, Part 7, Appendix, p. 29-37, 47th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 
68. Robert McElroy, Grover Cleveland, the Man and the States­
man, an Authorized Biography (New York, 1925), Vol.II.p.47. 
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passed and when the amendment concerning Pearl Harbor was 
ratified by Hawaii in 1887, the first step was taken by 
69 
the United States in securing territorial rights in Hawaii. 
England quickly realized the value of the cession and pro­
tested. She suggested that the United States join in the 
Franco-English agreement of 1843 by which those two nations 
agreed never to seize Hawaii, either directly or as a pro­
tectorate. Secretary Bayard refused to join in guaranteeing 
the neutrality of the Islands and declared in a note to the 
British premier that there was nothing in the cession of 
70 Pearl Harbor to impair the political sovereignty of Hawaii. 
As a result, nothing came of the British protest. President 
Cleveland, in fact was not averse to the annexation of Hawaii 
if the inhabitants of the Islands really wanted this step 
and his biographer, McElroy, says that there is no indica­
tion that he did not agree with the views of his Secretary 
of State Bayard, who later declared: "The obvious course was 
to wait quietly and patiently, and let the islands fill up 
up with American planters and American industries, until they 
should be wholly identified in business interests and political 
69. Foreign Relations, 1887, No. 381, 382, 383, 384; and 
Foreign Relations, 1888, Vol. I, No. 610. 
70. Foreign Relations, 1888, Vol. I, No. 614, 615, 618. In the 
same year, 1877, the United States opposed a suggested 
British loan of two million dollars to Hawaii with the 
government revenues as security. Allan Nevins, Grover 
Cleveland, A Study in Courage (New York, 1932), p. 550. 
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sympathies with the United States. It was simply a matter 
71 
of waiting until the apple should ripen and fall." 
Most of Kalakaua*s reign was spent in political strife. 
The cause for this trouble was the underlying difference 
between the political views of the king and those of the 
party who opposed him. Kalakaua believed that a king had 
absolute power as was permitted by the Hawaiian constitution 
of 1864. This constitution gave the king complete control 
of the cabinet through his power to appoint and dismiss 
ministers, also practical control of the legislature through 
his power to appoint them to public office. In addition to 
making use of these privileges, Kalakaua took the right to 
change the constitution as he desired and to influence elec­
tions. By 1880 he had working with him, two adventurers, 
Walter Murray Gibson, professional politician and editor, 
and Celso Cesar Moreno, a professional lobbyist. Through 
their influence, the king in 1880 executed a coup d'etat and 
appointed Moreno premier, causing much dissatisfaction. For 
the first time the opposition to him united, forcing him to 
remove Moreno. In 1882 Gibson became premier and it was 
understood that he had the backing of Spreckels, who was 
72 
rapidly becoming the power behind the throne. One of the 
71. McElroy, op. cit., II, p. 48. 
72. In 1877 Mr. Spreckels had brought about the resignation of 
the Cabinet in order to secure one which would grant him a 
long term water privilege on the island of Maui. 
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first measures brought before the Legislature was an act 
to convey about 24,000 acres of the crown lands of Wailulu 
to Spreekels, for the purpose of compromising his claim to 
an undivided share of the crown lands purchased from the 
half sister of Kamahameha IV. The cession of the island of 
Wailulu to Spreekels and the distrust of Gibson caused a 
reaction among the natives and the election of many Reform 
members to the next Legislature. Kalakaua, meanwhile, had 
had himself re-crowned, much to the disgust of the high 
chiefs and many foreigners who considered the ceremony as 
another step in the king*s plans to make himself absolute. 
He was now aspiring to extend a Hawaiian protectorate over 
the other Pacific islands, sending commissioners to various 
islands and warning the Great Powers of Europe against any 
further annexations. As his absolutist schemes advanced, he 
came into conflict with Mr. Spreekels who by 1886 had between 
$600,000 and |700,000 invested in the Hawaiian government. 
The trouble was brought to a crisis by Kalakaua*s attempt to 
secure a loan from London. Spreekels and the cabinet opposed 
this loan unless the debt to the sugar planter was paid 
first. The Legislature's vote was S3 to 14 against the 
cabinet and Spreekels in disgust severed his connections with 
the government. Acting as his own prime minister with the 
assistance of Gibson, the king now began a period of misrule 
40. 
73 
which, culminated in the revolt of 1887. 
Kalakaua's opposition believed that the government of 
Hawaii should be a constitutional monarchy with the power 
in the hands of the people. Early in 1887 they organized 
as the Hawaiian League. Two factions developed, the majority 
desiring a limited monarchy and the radical minority favor­
ing the establishment of a republic and annexation to the 
United States. In case the king refused to grant a constitu-
74 tion, all were to join in overthrowing the monarchy. The 
publication of reports of scandals in connection with the 
granting of opium licenses was the signal for a revolution 
which resulted in the constitution of 1887 making the king 
responsible to the cabinet, widening the franchise so as to 
include resident foreigners of English or American descent, 
and placing the election of nobles in the hands of voters of 
75 
foreign birth or foreign ancestry. As Kalakaua was strongly 
opposed to this constitution he set out to abolish it. 
Political unrest became greater and a revolution was attempted 
or actually took place nearly every year between 1887 and 
1895. In 1889 the United States marines, for the second time 
since the establishment of the Hawaiian monarchy, were called 
73. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, 
p. 179-215. 
74. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 270. 
75• House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, 
p. 193-197. 
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upon to intervene in an uprising in order to protect Ameri­
can property. This insurrection against the government, 
which was led by Robert W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd, two half-
caste Hawaiians, was defeated on the day it began. It was 
thought to have been instigated by Liliuokalani in an 
attempt to dethrone her brother Ealakaua who had lately 
76 
named her as his successor. 
The years between 1887 and 1890 were golden years for 
the sugar planters of Hawaii. The export of sugar continued 
to increase rapidly, dividends on plantation shares were 
large, and the price of sugar land was high. The sugar was 
sold to the Spreckels refinery which had a monopoly of sugar 
refining on the Pacific coast and forced them to accept 
slightly less than the entire amount of the remitted duty. 
Before 1890 the planters were not united and accepted varying 
prices for their sugar but after that time they combined and 
made contracts for a year or more, all planters to receive 
the same price. In 1889 Spreckels came up against the Ameri­
can Sugar Refining Company, a combination controlling produc­
tion in the east. The eastern company established a rival 
refinery in California and Spreckels built one in Philadelphia. 
In 1892 Spreckels joined the .American Sugar Company and as 
there was not enough business on the Pacific coast for two 
76. Carpenter, op. cit., p. 158. 
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refineries, his rival, the branch of the Sugar Trust, was 
discontinued, giving him even more control over the Hawaiian 
planters. By this time, however, other factors had begun to 
undermine the prosperity of the sugar-growers. There was a 
surplus in the United States* Treasury so large that the 
administration decided to devote part of the McKinley Tariff 
Bill to reducing duties on commodities. Choosing sugar, the 
most remumerative item of the old tariff, they repealed the 
duty on it and provided for a bounty of two cents per pound 
to be paid to sugar-growers in the United States. Short of 
complete destruction, the McKinley Bill of 1890 was probably 
the greatest calamity that could have descended upon the 
Hawaiian sugar men. It removed their advantage and placed 
them on the old basis of twenty years before. The price of 
sugar is said to have fallen in one day after the passage of 
the Bill from $100 to #60 per ton.77 Consul-General Severance 
in 1892 reported that the operation of the McKinley Bill had 
caused a loss of over $5,000,000 to the planters in the year 
no 
following its passage. This resulted in a depression in the 
Islands and the desire to restore the old profitable relations 
with the American market led directly to the Hawaiian revolu­
tion of 1893 and to the treaty of annexation arranged by the 
77. C. Whitney, The Hawaiian Islands, p. 194, quoted in 
F. W. Taussig, Seme Aspects of the Tariff Q.uestion 
(Cambridge, 1915), p. 61. 
78. Consular Reports, No. 142, p. 412. 
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Harrison administration. 
King Kalakaua died in 1890 while in the United States 
and his sister Liliuokalani ascended to the throne. Her 
political views resembled those of her brother but her friend­
ship was with England rather than America and she opposed the 
Pearl River clause of the reciprocity treaty. Although she 
disliked the constitutional limitations on her power, no 
great strife occurred until 1892. The parties in the Legis­
lature of 1892 were so evenly divided that long debates 
ensued over the principal questions, which concerned the 
Queen's control of the cabinet, an opium license bill, and a 
bill to give a franchise to a lottery company. The Queen 
favored all three measures and all three were defeated. 
Determined to remove the cabinet whose members included 
nearly all the principal business men of Hawaii, she appealed 
to the supreme court for their sanction of such a step, and 
they decided that the cabinet had been automatically dismissed 
by the death of Kalakaua. The Queen now began a long struggle 
over the composition of a new cabinet. She persisted in sub­
mitting to the Legislature the names of men whose character 
made them unfit for the ministry. The continued opposition 
of the Legislature finally farced her to agree to an acceptable 
list of fairly capable men, a distinct triumph for the Reform 
Party. This was unsatisfactory to Liliuokalani who desired a 
weak cabinet so that she could revise the constitution of 1887 
44 
as her next step toward reestablishment of absolutism. 
Just before the close of the Legislature in 1893, during the 
absence of some of the Reform Party, the opium and lottery 
bills were brought up again and passed and the cabinet dis­
missed. In return for her support of the lottery bill the 
Queen was to be allowed to proclaim a new constitution 
restoring the old despotic authority to the ruler. It was 
to be directed against the interests of the Americans as it 
provided that all white men, unless married to native women, 
were to be absolutely debarred from the suffrage. The 
Americans and other whites were seriously alarmed for they 
foresaw that the final result of such a policy wouia be either 
to drive them from the Islands or to place their property at 
79 
the mercy of anyone who wished to take it. As news of the 
new constitution began to spread, the excitement became so 
great that some of the Queen*s new cabinet, fearing a revolu­
tion, refused to sign it, and the matter had to be postponed. 
In order to prevent violence of any kind the Queen called out 
the royal troops plus an unauthorized force of five hundred 
men and secured control of the capital. 
The cabinet feared for their personal safety in the event 
of mob violence and appealed to the citizens for aid. Some 
79. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, 
p. 115. 
House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Gong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, p. 
T_ 
of the citizens, feeling that the legal authorities would 
be unable to handle matters, should further trouble arise, 
issued a call for those in opposition to the Q,ueen to form 
troops and to organize a committee for protection. A group 
met in the office of William 0. Smith and provided for the 
appointment of a committee of public safety of thirteen to 
maintain the peace. The committee called a mass meeting for 
Monday afternoon, January 16, to decide what steps should be 
taken. Alarmed by this time, the Queen issued a proclamation 
promising to abide by the constitution of 1887, and at the 
same time, her sympathizers called a rival mass meeting for 
Monday afternoon in order to draw people away from the 
revolutionary assemblage. The two meetings were in session 
at the same hour. The citizens at the armory empowered the 
committee of public safety to "further consider the situation 
and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to 
secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the pro-
80 
tection of life, liberty and property in Hawaii.w The 
committee soon decided to establish a Provisional Government 
for the management of affairs until annexation to the United 
States was secured, and appointed Sanford B. Dole, James A. 
King, Peter C. Jones, and William 0. Smith to make up the 
executive council. Due to the danger of conflict many United 
80. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 55d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, 
p. 127. 
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States* citizens asked the American minister to have a force 
of marines landed from the Boston, a naval vessel in the 
harbor under the command of Captain G. C. Wiltse. Captain 
Wiltse describes the proceedings in the capital in a letter 
81 
written on January 18, to B. F. Tracy, Secretary of the Navy. 
"At 4:30 p. m., January 16, I landed the ship's 
battalion under command of Lieut. Commander William 
T. Swinburne. 
"One detachment of marines was placed at the 
legation and one at the consulate, while the main body 
of men, with two pieces of artillery, were quartered 
in a hall of central location near the Government 
building. 
"On Tuesday, January 17, a provisional government 
was established and the Queen dethroned. 
"The Provisional Government took possession of the 
Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, 
the Queen acquiescing under protest. The Provisional 
Government was recognized as the de facto Government of 
the Hawaiian Islands by the United States minister." 
During the next few days the Provisional Government was 
recognized by all of the powers who had representatives in 
Honolulu. On January 19, the new officials sent a commission 
to the United States by special steamer for the purpose of 
negotiating a treaty of annexation. The five members of the 
committee were William C. Wilder, L. A. Thurston, W. H. 
Castle, H. P. Carter, and Mr. Marsden, who together repre­
sented a large proportion of the property holders and commer-
81. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, 
p. 203. 
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cial interests of the Islands. Paul Neuman, the attorney 
of Liliuokalani, left on the same steamer in order to pre­
sent her side of the revolution, and in case of annexation 
to secure for her as large an annuity as possible. Also at 
this time, the Queen sent a letter to President Harrison 
asking him to restore her to the throne and saying that she 
had yielded because she did not wish to come into conflict 
with the United States* troops which, she claimed, were landed 
83 
to aid the revolutionists. 
In Washington the commissioners were favorably received. 
The State Department since the Civil War had been decidedly 
jingoistic in attitude due largely to Seward and Blaine. 
During his year as Secretary of State under Garfield, Blaine 
inaugurated a comprehensive foreign policy which resented 
vigorously European interference in North and South American 
affairs, particularly in regard to an interoceanic canal, and 
attempted to make the United States the arbiter of the dis­
putes of the Latin American states, whether among themselves 
or with some foreign power. Mr. Blaine was made Secretary of 
State again in the Harrison administration, and again he pur­
sued his policy of interference in the domestic affairs in 
82. House Ex. Doc. No.48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess.,Vol.XXVII,pp.188-201. 
House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess.,Vol. XXVII, pp. 
311-327, gives a detailed account of the Hawaiian revolution 
as published by the Hawaiian Gazette Co., 1893. 
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Latin America using the threat of war to coerce them. His 
jingoism together with the extreme position taken by Congress 
nearly involved the United States in war with Great Britain 
over the seal-fisheries, in 1889. In this same year the 
American commissioners went to Bismarck's Berlin Congress 
where the Samoan affair was to be considered, and it was their 
cable saying that Bismarck flew into a rage whenever German 
domination in Samoa was questioned, which occasioned Blaine's 
famous reply: "The extent of the Chancellor's irritability is 
84 not the measure of American rights." As a result of the 
American stand in the affair, the three powers, Germany, 
England, and the United States entered into a treaty which 
guaranteed the autonomy of the islands, restored Malietoa to 
his throne, and provided for a tripartite protectorate over 
Samoa. This was certainly a departure from the traditional 
policy of avoiding "entangling alliances". In fact, the 
editor of the Nation describes Blaine as being popular with 
the people because of "his somewhat boisterous and often fan­
tastic egression of that longing for the spread of American 
influence and domination abroad, known as 'Americanism', which 
constitutes the conscious patriotism of large bodies of the 
less thoughtful voters", and which "more than compensated for 
84. McElroy, op. cit.. Vol. I, p. 260. 
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all his shortcomings" as a statesman. 
This policy was approved by John L. Stevens, who was 
appointed as United States minister to Hawaii in 1889. 
His reports not only gave detailed accounts of internal 
affairs in the Islands but also described their material 
resources and possibilities. In a confidential dispatch 
written November 20, 1892, two months before the Hawaiian 
revolution, he took up the question as to what should be done 
with the Islands. "One of two courses seems to me absolutely 
necessary to be followed," he wrote, "either bold and 
vigorous measures for annexation or a 'customs union*, an 
ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl 
Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied 
but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the 
islands. I believe the former to be the better," he continued, 
"that which will prove much the more advantageous to the 
islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end 
for the United States." In discussing the sugar bounty, he 
advised a stipulation in the treaty that Hawaiian planters 
would be paid a bounty of only six mills per pound rather than 
the two cents given American growers, and this to last only as 
85. The Nation, Vol. LVI, p. 75; Carl Russell Fish, The Path 
of Empire, A Chronicle of the United States as a World 
Power (New Haven, 1921); Mrs. Alice Felt Tyler, The Foreign 
Policy of James G. Blaine (Minneapolis, 1927); Edward 
Stanwood, James Gillespie Blaine (New York, 1905); Nearing 
and Freeman, op. cit., p. 243. 
long as the bounty-system was maintained. This small 
bounty would be enough to carry the planters through the 
depression occasioned by the McKinley Tariff. In closing 
his report, Minister Stevens made an even more definite ex­
pression of his conception of future American relations with 
Hawaii saying that although the American government must de­
cide which of the two lines of policy and action must be 
followed, it was certain "that the interests of the United 
States and the welfare of these islands will not permit the 
continuance of the existing state and tendency of things. 
Having for so many years extended a helping hand to the 
islands and encouraged the American residents and their 
friends at home to the extent we have, we can not refrain now 
from aiding them with vigorous measures, without injury to 
ourselves and those of our f kith and kin' and without neglect­
ing American opportunities that never seemed so obvious and 
86 
pressing as they do now." The arrival of the Hawaiian com­
missioner seeking annexation was no surprise, therefore, to the 
Secretary of State who by this time was John W. Foster, Mr. 
Blaine having died about February first. Mr. Foster, another 
follower of Blaine*s foreign policy, soon negotiated the treaty 
of annexation and rushed it to President Harrison who desired 
to settle the question before he went out of office on March 
86. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. 2XVTI, 
pp. 117-118. 
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fourth. In the absence of telegraphic communication, Secre­
tary Foster in making out his report had to place entire 
dependence upon Steven* s dispatches and the statements of the 
commissioners sent to Washington by the Provisional Govern­
ment. As one would expect, these all emphasized the blameless-
ness of the jjiierican part in the Hawaiian revolution, and this 
attitude was reflected in Mr. Foster's recommendations and in 
Harrison's message to the Senate. Mr. Foster pointed out in 
his communication to the President that the "unconstitutional 
and intemperate acts of the Q,ueen" were the immediate cause 
of the revolution, that the American marines took no part at 
all in effecting the change, that the Provisional Government 
took possession of the Government buildings without the help 
of the marines, that the Provisional Government was then recog­
nized by Stevens as having obtained full de facto control, 
that this same government was recognized by representatives of 
the other nations, and that instructions had been sent to 
Stevens approving his action as far as it coincided with 
standing instructions to the legation, and disavowing any 
steps in excess of such instructions which might seem "to 
have been asserted to the impairment of the independent 
sovereignty of the Hawaiian Government by the assumption of a 
87 
formal protectorate." President Harrison similarly assigned 
87. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, 
pp. 178-183. 
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as the cause of the recent trouble the "reactionary and 
revolutionary" policy of Liliuokalani which placed in peril 
the foreign investments and the "decent administration of 
civil affairs and the peace of the islands." Very firmly 
he asserted that the American government did not promote the 
subversion of the monarchy. There are two courses possible, 
to establish a protectorate or to annex the Islands, he be­
lieved, and the latter would be preferable from both the 
American and the Hawaiian points of view and would keep the 
88 other great powers out. He therefore strongly recommended 
prompt action in order to restore peace in the Islands. The 
press and the people of the United States seemed to favor his 
action and a rhyme about 
...Liliuokalani 
Give us your little brown hanniel 
89 became popular everywhere. News of Minister Stevens' 
establishment of a protectorate pending the settlement of the 
negotiations in Washington merely encouraged annexationist 
sentiment among the Jmerican people. Opposition papers pointed 
out that the revolution was a huge business scheme on the 
part of the sugar planters, the real cause being the forty 
two and two-thirds per cent reduction in the price of sugar. 
88. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, 
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The editor of the Nation brought out the fact that the 
sugar details of annexation were under discussion before 
there was a revolution. The five-year contracts of the 
Western Sugar Refining Company of San Francisco which were 
made with the leading Hawaiian planters included a clause 
stating that in case an arrangement should be made whereby 
the United States would pay a bounty to the Hawaiian planters, 
90 the latter would give a share to the Refining Company. Mr. 
Thurston of the Hawaiian Annexation Committee not only veri­
fied this report concerning the sugar contracts but also 
added that the Trust had said, "If you don't like these terms, 
eat your sugar." 
In the rush at the close of the Harrison administration, 
the annexation bill was not passed. There had been many 
rumors concerning Cleveland*s attitude, the majority believ­
ing that he would probably favor the treaty. At the time of 
the elections of 1892 the Hawaiian trouble had not arisen so 
the President could find but little in his party's platform 
to indicate his course of action. This platform in discussing 
foreign affairs had pointed out that the Democratic party was 
the only one that had "ever given the country a foreign 
policy consistent and vigorous, compelling respect abroad and 
inspiring confidence at home," and went on to "view with 
9°. The Nation, Vol. LVI, p. 151. 
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alarm the tendency to a policy of irritation and bluster 
which is liable at any time to confront us with the 
91 
alternative of humiliation or war." President Cleveland 
had already shown himself directly opposed to this practice 
of "irritation and bluster" for which Secretary of State 
James G. Blaine had been largely responsible. He had a very 
definite foreign policy of protecting the weak and helpless 
nations at a time when their domination was the aim of every 
other great power and he was old-fashioned enough to desire 
to avoid "entangling alliances" with foreign nations having 
advised against the participation of the United States in the 
tripartite protectorate of Samoa. During a conference with 
Gresham, Carlisle, and Lamont before the inauguration, the 
first steps in the Hawaiian affair were planned, leading on 
92 
March 9, 1895, to the recall of the treaty from the Senate. 
Cleveland did this, because the provisional government did 
not appear to have the sanction of either popular revolution 
or suffrage, because the uprising and negotiations had been 
conducted with such haste, and because Liliuokalani's state­
ment that she yielded on account of the support given by the 
United States troops to the Provisional Government, did not 
agree with President Harrison's pronouncement that the Ameri-
91. Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency (New York, 
1904), p. 501. 
92. Nevins, op. cit., p. 552. 
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can government had not in any way promoted the Hawaiian 
93 
revolution. In order to learn the truth of the matter, 
the President appointed James H. Blount as his personal 
representative to investigate the Hawaiian trouble. Mr. 
Blount was given paramount authority in all matters touching 
American relations with the Provisional Government. 
Most of the people believed that the removal of the 
treaty was merely a temporary measure and not a great deal 
of notice was taken of it. However, when Blount directed 
Admiral Skerrett to lower the United States flag from the 
Hawaiian Government Building, the Republican press began to 
rave about the stigma on our national honor while the 
Democrats answered that Steven*s action in establishing a 
protectorate was disavowed by Mr. Harrison and that President 
Cleveland was merely taking our flag off other people's 
property. During his stay of several weeks on the Islands, 
Commissioner Blount conducted a detailed investigation which 
led him to conclude that Minister Stevens had recognized the 
Provisional Government when the Queen's government was still 
in full control of the palace, the barracks, and the police 
station. Furthermore, "at an early stage of the movement, 
if not at the beginning, Mr. Stevens promised the annexation­
ists that as soon as they obtained possession of the Govern-
93. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. XXVII. 
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ment building and there read a proclamation..., he would 
at once recognize them as a de facto government, and sup­
port them by landing a force from our war ship then in the 
harbor." Minister Stevens kept his promise, Mr. Blount 
found, in fact, "this assurance was the inspiration of the 
movement, and without it the annexationists would not have 
exposed themselves to the consequences of failure," for 
they had practically no military forces. Thus, the action 
of the American minister and of the troops landed from the 
Boston were responsible for the establishment of the Pro­
visional Government and its continuation was due to the fact 
that the Hawaiians believed they would be attacking the 
94 
United States' Government if they attacked it. The 
annexationists dared not put the question to a vote for if 
aliens were excluded from voting, annexation would be defeated 
by more than five to one. Secretary of State Foster was not 
to be blamed for the stand he had taken, Mr. Blount felt, be­
cause he was deceived by the misleading reports of Minister 
Stevens and by the statements of the Hawaiian commissioners. 
The latter conclusion, as well as all of the Commissioner's 
findings, were confirmed by Charles Nordhoff, a veteran 
Washington correspondent sent out by the New York Herald to 
94. Taken from summary found in Secretary Gresham*s report, 
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make an independent investigation. Due to a leak in the 
State department, Blount's report was prematurely published 
late in November. Some of the editorial comment following 
its appearance is quoted by McElroy in his biography of 
95 Grover Cleveland. 
"No one unprejudiced," states the New York Herald in an 
editorial of November 22, "can read Mr. Blount's report with­
out the conviction that it goes into the archives of the 
State Department at Washington as the darkest chapter in the 
diplomatic annals of this country." 
The editor of the New York Times believed that it "re­
veals a conspiracy...which if not repudiated by this nation, 
would sully the honor and blacken the fair name of the United 
States." 
If the people of the country accept Mr. Blount's report, 
declared the Savannah Morning News, they "cannot do otherwise 
than sustain the position taken by the President and his 
Cabinet. The only way to create a sentiment against that 
position is to show that Mr. Blount's report is not correct." 
Friends of Stevens and of the treaty immediately began 
working through the press and through Congress to discredit 
the Commissioner's facts. They claimed that in his investiga­
tion he talked merely with the supporters of "the lady who 
95. McElroy, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 57-59. 
looks like the inside of a package of Arbuckle's coffee," 
and declined all offers of the friends of the Provisional 
Government when they desired to assist him. Taking the 
revolution and subsequent events step by step, they showed 
the innocence of Stevens and the "gross inaccuracies" of 
Blount's report. The Congressmen from Maine who had long 
been personal friends of Stevens, testified as to his honor 
and pointed out that Secretary Gresham as an inveterate enemy 
of Blaine and of ex-president Harrison had ample motive for 
attacking Blaine's friend and Harrison's appointee. A de­
tailed reply was issued by Mr. Stevens in answer to Blount's 
charges. In this the Minister maintained that his actions 
were above criticism and that he had merely carried out the 
spirit of the only instructions he had for precedent in such 
an emergency. These had been sent to Minister Merrill at the 
time of the revolution of 1887 by Secretary Bayard, who wished 
all precautions to be taken for "the Just protection of the 
interests of American citizens in the Islands. While we 
abstain from interfering with the domestic affairs of Hawaii, 
in accordance with the policy and practice of this government," 
Mr. Bayard had written, "yet obstruction to the channels of 
legitimate commerce under existing law must not be allowed, and 
American citizens must be protected in their persons and 
property by the representatives of their country's law and 
power and no internal discord must be suffered to impair them." 
59. 
In addition in his defense Mr. Stevens said that he raised 
the American flag over the Hawaiian Government Building be­
cause the Provisional Government, being only two weeks old, 
had no trained troops for its use. Furthermore, the temporary 
protectorate was sufficient to keep Japan and England from 
intervening, should they desire to do so, and was probably 
the best method available for preserving Hawaii for the United 
96 
States. In spite of annexationist attempts to prove the 
contrary, however, the agreement of Nordhoff and other dis­
interested spectators with Blount caused the majority to be­
lieve that the revolution was practically a put-up job of 
Stevens and probably to some degree a commercial speculation. 
It required more than two months for President Cleveland 
to formulate a definite policy on the basis of Blount's 
report. Secretary Gresham believed that since the Q,ueen 
had thrown herself on the mercy of the United States and had 
been betrayed, justice demanded that steps should now be 
taken to restore her. Just what steps should be taken was 
difficult to decide so the advice of the various members of 
the Cabinet was asked. The opinion of Attorney General 
Richard Olney furnished the basis for the plan finally 
adopted. After summarizing the origin of the "Steven*s 
government" he suggested: 
96. Cong. Rec., 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXYI, Part 1, 
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"1. All the resources of diplomacy should be ex­
hausted to restore the status quo in Hawaii by peaceful 
methods and without force. 
"2. If, as a last resort, force is found to be neces­
sary...the matter must be submitted to Congress for its 
action. 
"3. In addition to providing for the security of the 
queen's person pending efforts to reinstate the queen's 
government.. .the United States should require of the queen... 
authority to negotiate and bring about the restoration of 
her government on such reasonable terms and conditions as 
the United States may approve and find to be practicable. 
"Among such terms and conditions must be, I think, full 
pardon and amnesty for all connected with the Stevens govern­
ment who might otherwise be liable tc be visited with the 
97 
pains and penalties attending the crime of treason." 
Combining Gresham*s suggestion with Mr. Olney*s opinion, 
President Cleveland directed Albert S. Willis, the new 
minister to Hawaii, to secure frcrn the Q,ueen a grant of full 
amnesty to the revolutionists and then to advise the Pro­
visional Government of the decision and ask them to relinquish 
the authority to Liliuokalani. If this could not be done by 
peaceful means Mr. Willis was to report the facts back to 
97. McElroy, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 59, 60. 
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Washington for the President had no intention of using 
force to restore her since that would require the author-
98 
ity of Congress. What would happen in the event of a 
refusal from either party, no one had considered. 
Part of the official action had "become public and many 
speculations were being made as to the matter when President 
Cleveland sent his First Annual Message to Congress on 
December 4, 1893. It was very disappointing, revealing far 
too little of the official action to be satisfactory to the 
senators and representatives. Beyond all question, it 
stated, "the constitutional Government of Hawaii had been 
subverted with the active aid of our representative to that 
Government and through the intimidation caused by the 
presence of an armed naval force of the United States, which 
was landed for that purpose at the instance of our minister." 
Due to our guilt, the President felt that the "only honor­
able course for our Government to pursue was to undo the 
wrong that had been done by those representing us and to 
restore as far as practicable the status existing at the time 
of our forcible intervention." He explained that he had sent 
a new minister to Hawaii in order to carry out this plan, 
promising, as soon as he had notice of definite results, to 
send the information together with Blount's report to Congress 
98. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, 
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for consideration. 
Meanwhile, Minister Willis had not yet had much success 
in securing "definite results" in Hawaii. When he had asked 
Liliuokalani, in his first interview, if she would, upon 
restoration "by the United States, grant full amnesty to the 
revolutionists, she had refused. Instead of granting 
amnesty she would follow the laws of Hawaii which direct 
that such people be beheaded and their property confiscated.100 
This was rather discouraging to the minister who began to 
wonder how the government could be sustained if it were 
restored. "It would fall to pieces like a card house," he 
wrote to the President.101 Mr. Cleveland began to see where 
Secretary Gresham's policy was leading him and determining 
to turn the whole affair over to Congress, he asked Carlisle 
102 and Olney to prepare a special message for him. This 
document was sent to Congress on December 18, 1893. Appeal­
ing to the traditional standards of the American republic, 
the President opened with a challenge: 
"I suppose that right and justice should determine 
the path to be followed in treating this subject. If 
national honesty is to be disregarded and a desire for 
territorial extension, or dissatisfaction with a form 
99. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and 
Paperscf the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington, 1901), 
Yol. IX, p. 441, 442. 
100.House Ex. Doc. No. 70, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, 
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of government not our own, ought to regulate our con­
duct, I have entirely misapprehended the mission and 
character of our Government and the behavior which 
the conscience of our people demands of their public 
servants." 
After stating his reasons for withdrawing the treaty 
from the Senate, Mr. Cleveland proceeded to convict Minister 
Stevens, showing that he "zealously promoted" annexation 
because he desired that it should be during his ministry, and 
that he was not "inconveniently scrupulous as to the means 
employed to that end." His reports after March 8, 1892, 
denoted an increasing annexationist feeling and prepared the 
reader for his statement of February 1, 1893: "The Hawaiian 
pear is now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the 
United States to pluck it." The Committee of Safety whose 
aim was annexation, were in communication with him and on 
January 16, being "unwilling to take further steps 
without the cooperation of the United States Minister," 
they sent him a note representing that the public safety was 
menaced and concluding: "We are unable to protect ourselves 
without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the 
United States forces." Becoming frightened by their action, 
the Committee withdrew their request, but it was too late as 
the note had been forwarded to the Boston. That evening 
the detachment of marines was landed, this demonstration 
being virtually an act of war as there was no evidence that 
they were actually needed for the protection of .American 
property. On the following day, by rather devious 
methods, the Provisional Government was proclaimed and was 
recognized by Mr. Stevens "pursuant to prior agreement," 
although it was actually neither a government de facto or 
de .jure. A note found in the legation files at Honolulu 
addressed by the head of the Provisional Government to 
Stevens expressed appreciation of the minister's recognition, 
stating that the Provisional Government was "not yet in the 
possession of the station house (the place where a large 
number of the Queen's troops were quartered), though the 
same had been demanded of the Queen's officers in charge." 
Since the United States was now allied with the Pro­
visional Government, Mr. Cleveland's message continued, the 
Queen knew she could not withstand the power of our country, 
and believing that she could safely trust to our justice, she 
surrendered to her enemies. With her protest in their hands, 
they turned to the United States to sell her kingdom and 
very nearly succeeded. "The control of both sides of a 
bargain acquired in such a manner," Mr. Cleveland said of 
the Harrison treaty, "is called by a familiar and unpleasant 
name when found in private transactions," an accusation 
< 
which we scrupulously avoided in former days. But our duty 
did not end with having refused to "consummate this ques­
tionable transaction" for our country must attempt to make 
all possible reparation to the wronged queen. On the other 
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hand, since the members of the Provisional Government 
were "led to their present predicament of revolt...by the 
indefensible encouragement and assistance of our 
diplomatic representative," their safety should be con­
sidered too. The State Department in following this policy 
had tried to persuade the queen to promise amnesty to the 
revolutionists as the main condition of her restoration, but 
had met with failure. Since she had refused to accept the 
condition, the plan had gone no farther and "public misrep­
resentations of the situation and exaggerated statements" 
of public sentiment had made successful executive mediation 
nearly impossible. Since the matter had gone beyond the 
bounds of the presidential authority Mr. Cleveland was trans­
ferring the entire problem to Congress, promising his cooper-
103 
ation whenever necessary. 
The discussion at the time of the publication of Blount's 
report was as nothing compared to the criticism which broke 
forth as a result of this message. The country was instantly 
divided into two parties upon the question, the Republicans 
and part of the Democrats denouncing his course, while part 
of the Democrats applauded the high moral stand he had taken. 
The Senate decided that since they had heard the annexation­
ist arguments approving the actions of Stevens and the Pro-
103. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII. 
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visional Government, and Mr. Cleveland's message opposing 
them, they would authorize the Committee on Foreign Re­
lations to inquire into the matter and decide which was 
really right. The Senate, as a matter of fact, had felt 
for many months that the President was exceeding his con­
stitutional authority and they wished to discourage such 
tendencies. As far as the Hawaiian question was concerned, 
however, they might as well have saved their time for it 
was already being taken out of their hands by other forces. 
On the day upon which the special message was sent to 
Congress, Liliuokalani had finally consented to grant amnesty 
to those who had been instrumental in overthrowing her, and 
on the same day President Dole had asked Mr. Willis if his 
actions were hostile to the Provisional Government. The 
minister answered by demanding the surrender of the consti­
tutional authority to the Q,ueen. President Dole refused, 
claiming that the United States had no right to interfere 
with a de facto government, denying the charges made by 
Blount, and refusing to restore the government to 
Liliuokalani. Mr. Willis recognized the truth of his claim 
but decided to try a ruse before giving up his efforts. 
Making use of the fact that the revenue cutter Corwin had 
just arrived with dispatches whose contents were unknown to 
Dole, the Minister had troops drawn up on the decks of the 
Adams and the Philadelphia, as though they were to be landed 
to make an attack. This attempt to "bluff out" the Pro­
visional Government failed to convince Dole and it now be­
came clear that the matter was settled since President 
Cleveland had no right to use force and evidently public 
sentiment did not back his policy to that extent. 
News of Minister Willis's attempt to use force, an 
action certainly contravening the spirit of his instruc­
tions, resulted in demands for the impeachment of Cleveland. 
During the long debate which took place before his Hawaiian 
message, the idea of manifest destiny had become popular 
and each believer in this doctrine now felt himself per­
sonally thwarted by the attempt to restore the Queen. In 
February the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs was 
submitted to Congress by Senator Morgan of Alabama, a member 
of the President's party. The conclusions of the report, all 
of which were accepted only by Mr. Morgan, absolved President 
Cleveland from any irregularity of conduct and defended 
Minister Stevens from most of the charges against him. "In 
his dealings with the Hawaiian Government, his conduct was 
characterized by becoming dignity and reserve," the report 
read, and "the only substantial irregularity that existed in 
the conduct of any officer of the United States or agent of 
the President, during or since the time of the revolution 
of 1893," was Mr. Stevens* action in establishing a protec­
torate. The four other Democrats on the committee, Senators 
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M. C. Butler, David Turpie, John W. Daniel, and George 
Gray, agreed in the belief that the President committed 
no irregularities in the appointment of Mr. Blount or the 
instructions given him, but they disagreed regarding the 
exoneration of Minister Stevens. They believed his con­
duct to be "seriously reprehensible and deserving of public 
censure" because it "was directly conducive to bringing 
about the condition of affairs which resulted in the over­
throw of the Q,ueen, the organization of the Provisional 
Government, the landing of the United States troops, and 
the attempted scheme of annexation." Both Mr. Butler arid 
Mr. Turpie favored annexation but did not wish to take ad­
vantage of internal dissension in the Islands as a pretext. 
The four Republican members of the committee, Senators 
John Sherman, William P. Frye, J. N. Dolph, andCushman 
K. Davis, differed from Mr. Morgan's first conclusion and 
issued a statement of their own. They believed (1) that 
Blount's appointment was unconstitutional, (2) that placing 
the Honolulu naval forces under Blount and Willis was un­
lawful, (3) that Mr. Blount's order to lower the flag was 
unlawful and his intercourse with the Q,ueen both unconsti­
tutional and contrary to international law, (4) that 
Cleveland had no authority to reopen the Hawaiian question 
after Harrison had settled it by recognizing the Provisional 
Government, and (5) that the actions of Blount and Willis 
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were all recognized as attempts to carry out the Presi-
104 
dent's expressed policy. 
After the publication of this report, the "Hawaiian 
Question" took on a partisan aspect. Congress had three 
alternatives before her, namely, to recognize the Provisional 
105 
Government, to restore the Q,ueen, or to take a plebiscite. 
The supporters of Mr. Cleveland ignored the findings of the 
Senate Committee and argued that annexation should not take 
place until a plebiscite had been taken in the Islands. 
Additional reasons for delay advanced by them were the dis­
tance of Hawaii from our coast, its uselessness as a naval 
strategic point, the impossibility of admitting its 
heterogeneous population to citizenship, and the national­
istic feeling of the natives. Those favoring annexation 
urged the great preponderance of American capital and in­
fluence in the Islands, their value from a military and 
naval point of view, and their commercial opportunities,as 
reasons for their immediate acquisition. As the discussion 
went on, it became evident that the House was unwilling to 
take steps to restore the Q,ueen by force while the Senate 
104. Sen. Rep. No. 227, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. LL. 
105• The Nation, Yol. LYII, p. 443. 
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believed that the United States should keep out of 
Hawaiian affairs for the present and should insist that 
other nations do likewise. This was tantamount to 
recognizing the Provisional Government and postponing 
annexation until a more convenient time. With this en­
couragement the Dole government proclaimed the Hawaiian 
Republic on July 4, 1894, and as its stability was evident, 
President Cleveland withdrew the American war vessels and 
gave it formal recognition. Having thus recognized that 
Dole * s government was "able to speak with the voice of 
Hawaiian sovereignty," McElroy, Mr. Cleveland's biographer, 
believes that the President was illogical when he sub-
1 
sequently refused its request for annexation. The 
royalists, as a result, believed that he still favored 
their cause and tried unsuccessfully to enlist his aid 
in their last attempt against the Dole government, the 
revolt of 1895, which met defeat. 
106. McElroy, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 69-70. 
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Affairs in Hawaii were much relieved "by the passage 
of the Wilson-Gorman tariff. By December 4, 1893, the 
Wilson bill, representing Mr. Cleveland's tariff ideas, was 
ready to present to Congress. Placing lumber, coal, iron, 
wool, raw sugar and refined sugar on the free list and cut­
ting down the duty on manufactured woolens, linens, and cot­
tons, it brought a storm of opposition. To this the various 
sugar interests contributed for it struck a blow at both the 
sugar trust which was subsidized by the HcKinley bill and 
the sugar growers who had been the recipients of a bounty 
since 1900. The Wilson tariff passed the House but met with 
so many amendments in the Senate that its entire nature was 
changed. Here the sugar trust was so successful in securing 
protection that the Senate appointed a committee to investi­
gate their methods. H. 0. Havemeyer, president of the Sugar 
Trust, admitted on the stand that the Trust regularly con­
tributed to campaign funds - to the Republican fund in a 
Republican state and to the Democratic fund in a Democratic 
state. These contributions were concealed on their books 
as "expenses". He also admitted that the Trust kept lobby­
ists in Washington while the Wilson bill was before Congress 
in order to influence the Congressmen to favor the sugar in-
107 
terests. Both Senators McFherson and Quay admitted 
107. Sen. Rep. No. 606, 53rd Cong. 2d Sess. 
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having purchased sugar stocks while the debate was in 
progress, Senator Quay expressing his intention to continue. 
Nothing was done in regard to Havemeyer and the senators 
escaped with a censure. After a two-months' tariff war the 
compromise Wilson-Gorman bill was passed, providing, among 
other changes, for a forty-per cent ad valorem duty on raw 
sugar and one-eighth of a cent a pound on refined. 
The reciprocity treaty between the United States and 
Hawaii was still in force, being subject after 1894 to ter­
mination at a twelve months' notice. As a result, the res­
toration of duties on sugar placed Hawaii on the old profit­
able basis, at the same aiding them indirectly by ruining 
the Cuban sugar business and precipitating a revolution 
I AO 
there. An idea of the effect on sugar crops may be 
gained from the following figures which were made public by 
109 
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association. The increase 
in the output, most noticeable in 1895-S6, continued until 
1908 when it reached one billion pounds. 
1890-91 146,174 tons 
1891-92 122,279 n 
1892-93 152,621 » 
1893-94 166,432 » 
1894-95 149,627 " 
1895-96 225,828 " 
1896-97 248,555 M 
108. Cuba had no reciprocity treaty with the United States. 
She had developed sugar planting under the encourage­
ment of the McKinley bill. 
109. Consular Report, Vol. LVT, No. 209, p. 238. 
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As prosperity returned to the sugar industry, it returned 
to all Hawaii. Total imports rose from #5,339,785 in 1895 
to $6,063,652 in 1896. Of this amount, $4,516,319 worth 
were from the United States in 1895 and #5,464,208 worth in 
1896. In 1896 American ships carried exports valued at 
#13,502,410 and imports valued at $7,164,561. Of the entire 
export and import trade in 1896, the United States had 82.53 
per cent; Great Britain 7.93; Germany 2.98; and Hawaii 5.26P" 
The revival of Hawaiian trade and industry had the effect of 
lessening the pressure of the annexationists for the time 
being. Having had one demonstration of the entire dependence 
of Hawaiian progress on the desires and whims of American 
politicians, they were not likely to drop all agitation, how­
ever. Annexation was the step which would place them perman­
ently within the hounds of American protection and assure 
them of unremitted prosperity. 
During the debate on the Hawaiian question British pub­
lic sentiment had urged this country to take over the Islands 
and become an imperialistic nation. Now, in the latter part 
of 1894 and in 1895 the British minister took a step which 
eventually provided the annexationists with one of their 
most telling arguments. This was the request for the cession 
110- Commercial Relations of the United States, 1895 and 
1896, Vol. I, pp. 1008-1013. 
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of Neckar Island, French. Frigate Shoal, or Bird Island for 
the purpose of establishing a station for a submarine tele­
graphic cable there. On account of the distance between Van­
couver and the Australian coast, the proposed terminii of 
the cable, it was desirable to have a station in mid-ocean 
between these points. A spur was to be extended to Hawaii. 
Since the Hawaiian government had agreed by the reciprocity 
treaty not to allow any nation to land a telegraphic cable 
upon its shores without the previous consent of the United 
States, they submitted the matter to the United States with­
out even expressing an opinion. On January 9, 1895, Presi­
dent Cleveland submitted the British request to Congress 
recommending that it be granted, "especially in view of the 
fact that our own communication with that country would there­
by be greatly improved without apparent detriment to any 
legitimate American interest.Congress did not agree 
with the President. It believed that Great Britain wished 
to establish this cable mainly for military purposes and 
that it would lead to British superiority over the United 
States in case of a war involving the Islands. As a result 
the request was not granted. Undaunted, the British now tried 
another method. A few months later, two men came to Honolulu 
where they excited suspicion by their persistent inquiries 
111. Richardson, op. cit., Vol. IX, pp. 559-60. 
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concerning the exact status of Neckar Island. As this 
island had never been formally claimed, the Hawaiian govern­
ment began to suspect a plan to seize it for Great Britain. 
A party was therefore sent out to take formal possession and 
the efforts of Great Britain ceased. The indignant American 
Senate, strongly resenting this attempt, passed a resolution 
to the effect that any interference of a foreign nation with 
the Hawaiian Islands would be regarded as an act of unfriend­
liness toward the United States. This showed a growing con­
sciousness of the fact that Hawaii was a part of the so-called 
"American system,* and gave a decided impetus to sentiment 
favoring acquisition. 
In 1896 this sentiment was embodied in a plank of the 
Republican platform stating that "the Hawaiian Islands should 
be controlled by the United States, and no foreign power 
112 should be permitted to interfere with them." One of the 
men helping to draw up this declaration was Joseph B. Foraker 
who made the nominating speech for McXinley at the St. Louis 
convention. In speaking of the stand taken on the Hawaiian 
question, Foraker said that it was in "exact accord" with 
some remarks that he made at a banquet given on February 22, 
1896, in honor of his election as senator. At this time he 
112. Stanwood, op. cit., p. 535. 
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had said:"*""^ 
"The time has come ishen there is an emphatic 
demand for a wise, broad, patriotic, progressive 
aggressive American statesmanship. I do not like 
the idea of our being unable to step out at either 
our front door or back door, on the Atlantic or 
the Pacifie side, without seeing England's flag 
floating from all the islands that meet our view, 
with her guns pointing wheresoever she will. When 
the Sandwich Islands come knocking at the door 
with a republican form of government and the Amer­
ican flag, I say, let them in." 
These were the ideas of the great majority of Republi­
cans, Mr. Foraker said, and Mr. McKinley had known these to 
be his sentiments when asking him to attend the convention 
and assist in making the platform. No such beliefs were in 
the minds of the Democrats who were looking around for 
another issue to revive their rapidly waning prestige. They 
did not even mention Hawaii. The public reaction against 
all of Cleveland's policies was so great that the Republicans 
claimed without much contradiction that they "could nominate 
114 a rag baby and elect it President" that year. 
Almost immediately, upon the return of the Republicans 
to power, a new treaty was drawn up. It was submitted to 
the Senate on June 16, 1897, accompanied by a message from 
115 President McKinley. After mentioning various events in 
113. Joseph Benson Foraker, Motes of a Busy Life (Cincinnati, 
1917), Vol. I, pp. 483-5. 
114. Stanwood, op. cit., p. 525. 
115. Sen. Rep. No. 681, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. III. 
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American relations with Hawaii, he summarized the policy of 
the United States toward them as one which has consistently 
favored their autonomous welfare, with the exclusion of all 
foreign influence save our own, to the extent of upholding 
eventual annexation as the necessary outcome of that policy." 
The failure of annexation in 1893 "may not be a cause for 
congratulation," Mr. McKinley continued, but it "is certain­
ly a proof of the disinterestedness of the United States, 
the delay of four years having abundantly sufficed to estab­
lish the right and the ability of the Republic of Hawaii to 
enter, as a sovereign contractant, upon a conventional union 
with the United States, thus realizing a purpose held by the 
Hawaiian people and proclaimed by successive Hawaiian govern­
ments through some twenty years of their virtual dependence 
upon the benevolent protection of the United States. Under 
such circumstances," the President concluded, "annexation is 
116 
not a change. It is a consummation." 
The annexation treaty of 1897 was also accompanied by 
a report from Secretary Sherman stating that Hawaii was 
sending to the United States "not a commission representing 
a successful revolution, but the accredited plenipotentiary 
117 of a constituted and fimly established sovereign state." 
116. Sen. Rep. No. 681, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., Appendix 2, 
pp. 65-67. 
117. Ibid., 74. 
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This change nominally placed Hawaii in a position much 
stronger than that of 1893. Since no criticism could be 
made of the Republic as the representative of Hawaiian sov­
ereignty, manifest destiny was clearly the issue. President 
McKinley now invited delay, urging "due deliberation" upon 
the Senate, in great contrast to President Harrison's message 
of 1893 asking for prompt action. In fact, Senator Davis, 
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, admitted that 
the sending in of the Hawaiian treaty at this time was only 
a political move and that no attempt would be made to ratify 
it at the present session. The editor of the Nation accused 
the Administration of "playing fast and loose with the 
lift 
Hawaiians in order to crowd through its tariff." 
Delay in dealing with the Hawaiian question had always 
seemed to redound to the credit of the annexationists, and 
the passage of time seemed to demonstrate as to the truth of 
their thesis. Soon after the treaty was sent to the Senate, 
imperialists were furnished another argument when the 
Japanese government instructed their minister to formally 
HQ 
protest against the annexation for the following reasons: 
"First - The maintenance of the status quo of 
Hawaii is essential to the good understanding of 
the Powers that have interests in the Pacific. 
"Second - The annexation of Hawaii would tend 
118. The Nation, Vol. IXEV, p. 463. 
119. Ibid., Yol. IXV, p. 24. 
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to endanger the residential, commercial, and in­
dustrial rights of Japanese subjects in Hawaii, 
secured to them by treaty and by the Constitution 
and laws of that country. 
"Third - Such annexation might lead to the 
postponement by Hawaii of the settlement of claims 
and liabilities already existing in favor of Japan 
under treaty stipulations.M 
Although Japan had made no protest in 1893 when annexation 
was contemplated she had since then defeated China and had 
suddenly become the leading nation of Asia. The Japanese 
poured into the Islands so rapidly after 1893 that the 
Hawaiian government feared an attempt on the part of Japan 
at control through colonization. Convinced that many 
Japanese were entering in violation of the immigration laws, 
one thousand were refused admission in 1897. Their govern­
ment protested and demanded indemnity, thus leading to a 
complicated discussion which was in progress when the protest 
to the United States was made. In response to Secretary Sher­
man's suspicions that Japan wanted Hawaii for herself, Minis­
ter Hoshi issued a statement saying that she had "absolutely 
120 
no designs of any kind whatever inimical to Hawaii." She 
was intervening only for the purpose of safeguarding the 
rights of twenty-five thousand of her subjects resident in 
the Islands. Mr. McKinley found it hard to fully credit this 
statement and so did thousands of annexationists who now 
120. The Nation, Vol. IXV, pp. 79, 80. 
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argued that Hawaii would soon be a Japanese colony if the 
United States did not take her.121 Eventually Japan with-
122 drew her protest and the matter was dropped. 
On September 16 the treaty of annexation was signed by 
the Hawaiian Senate and its friends believed that when 
Congress met in December it could be rushed through without 
much trouble, probably before the holiday recess. President 
McKinley in his December message touched upon the question 
very lightly saying he tkought that "every consideration of 
dignity and honor" required that the treaty be ratified.123 
"Fifty Opinions of the Presidents Message" were printed by 
Public Opinion on December 16. Republican, Democratic, and 
Independent comment of the fifty newspapers were given 
separately. All of the Republican organs except the Omaha 
Bee were silent on the subject of Hawaii. The Bee criticized 
the President's failure to present some practical reasons for 
annexation and believed that he took a "singular view...of a 
scheme concocted and promoted by a few political adventurers. 
121. George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Tears, (New 
Yorfc, 1906), Vol. II, pp. 305-509. Some even advocated 
the establishment of a protectorate saying that Hawaii 
would not be able to maintain herself against Japan 
while waiting for the treaty. 
122. Hawaii paid her an indemnity of $75,000 in order to 
settle the immigration trouble. "Japan's Hawaiian In­
demnity" from Honolulu Hawaiian Gazette, reprinted in 
Public Opinion, Vol. 2XV, No. 8, pp. 236-7» 
123. Senate Journal, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., pp. 4-11* 
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...No less remarkable," the Bee continued, "is the state­
ment of the president that the Hawaiians 'have come of their 
free will to merge their destinies in our body politic', the 
fact being that the native Hawaiians have had no opportunity 
to express their will except through public meetings and 
these have shown that they are almost unanimously opposed to 
annexation." 124 
The "Hawaiian grab" was mentioned by seven of the other 
12*5 newspapers quoted, three Democratic and four Independent. ^ 
These were the Louisville Courier Journals the Pittsburg 
Post, the St. Paul Globe, the Boston Herald, the Indianapo­
lis Hews, the Pittsburg Chronicle-Telegraph, and the Detroit 
Free Press, and all expressed themselves adversely upon the 
part of the Presidents message dealing with Hawaii which 
the Chronicle Telegraph characterized as "mere twaddle"#126 
In the three months debate which followed, "manifest 
destiny" in Hawaii was considered from every angle and oppo­
sition to the policy gradually increased. On February 24, 
1898, the Nation in describing the progress of the discus­
sion, said that while the scheme was sure to be opposed from 
124. Omaha (Nebr.) Bee, "Fifty Opinions of the President's 
Message", in Public Opinion, Vol. XXIII, No. 25, p. 773. 
125. Pittsburg (Pa.) Post calls-annexation the "Hawaiian 
grab". 
126. "Fifty Opinions of the President's Message", in Public 
Opinion, Vol. XXIII, No. 25, pp. 773-776. 
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the first by nearly all of the Democratic Senators, it was 
now fought openly by such Republicans as Senator Morrill of 
Vermont and Senator Gear of Iowa. All through the north the 
Republican press was turning against annexation. As public 
sentiment declared against "manifest destiny", the senators 
who had been without strong convictions in the beginning 
had tended to turn against it too. As a result, one opposi­
tion senator estimated that at that time there would be more 
127 
than forty votes against the treaty. By March the Adminis­
tration had ceased to push annexation with much force and 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had recognized 
the impossibility of securing a two-thirds vote. They 
abandoned the treaty about the middle of March. Senator 
Hanna's support of the Presidents imperialistic policy 
seemed to have availed nothing and the accord of the Four, 
Senators Aldrich, Allison, 0. H. Piatt, and Spooner, was 
set at naught. But "manifest destiny" was not defeated, it 
was merely gathering forces for a final attack. Less than 
a month later, Beveridge, then a candidate for the Senate 
was re-stating the doctrine of all imperialists in his 
"March of the Nations" speech. Asked to make a talk on 
Ulysses S. Grant, he "threw a bomfcshell among the tables 
127. The Nation, Vol. LOTI, p. 139. 
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when lie "began in the strain" 
"He (Grant) never forgot that we are a conquering 
race and that we must obey our blood and occupy new 
markets, and, if necessary, new lands...* 
"American factories are making more than the 
American people can use; American soil is producing 
more than they can consume. Fate has written our 
policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall 
be ours. And we will get it as our mother (England) 
has told us how. We will establish trading-posts 
throughout the world as distributing points for Ameri­
can products. We will cover the ocean with our mer­
chant marine. We will build a navy to the measure of 
our greatness. Great colonies governing themselves 
flying our flag and trading with us, will grow about 
our posts of trade. Our institutions will follow our 
flag on the wings of our commerce. And American law, 
American order, American civilization, and the Ameri­
can flag will plant themselves on shores hitherto 
bloody and benighted, but by those agencies of God 
henceforth to be made beautiful and bright...• 
"If this means the Stars and Stripes over an 
Isthmian canal...over Hawaii.. .over Cuba and the 
southern seas...then let us meet that meaning with 
a mighty joy and make that meaning good, no matter 
what barbarism and all our foes may do or say.* 
Events again began shaping themselves in a manner to 
demonstrate the arguments of the annexationists. On April 
19, a joint resolution of Congress empowered the President 
to intervene forcibly in Cuba and establish peace there. 
The Navy Department, foreseeing that in case of a war with 
Spain it would be desirable to attack her dependencies, had 
already sent Admiral Itewey to Hongkong where he was ready 
to leave for the Philippines at a momentfs notice. His 
128. Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and, the Progressive Era 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1932) p. 68,69. 
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1 PQ 
order Game from Secretary Long on April 25:xc'5 
"War lias commenced between the United States and 
Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. 
Commence operations particularly against the Spanish 
fleet. Tou must capture vessels or destroy. Use 
utmost endeavor." 
Obeying orders, Admiral Dewey, on May 1, took Manila 
bay. Owing to laek of a sufficient landing force he did not 
occupy Manila itself until August 13. Mow the value of Hono­
lulu as a port of call for coal and fresh provisions was 
shown. When reenf or cements were sent to Dewey, the Hawaiian 
government, which under international law should have at 
once declared her neutrality, declined to take this step 
and permitted troops to land for supplies. The Spanish con­
sul at Honolulu immediately protested at her grant of the 
use of her harbors to a belligerent nation. The Hawaiian 
government declared that the United States was her best 
friend and she would welcome the American troops in her 
harbors and on her shore. This was in reality a declara­
tion of alliance with the United States though no formal 
alliance existed. This action, together with the fore­
shadowed policy in the Philippines made certain that an­
nexation would come soon. 
In the meantime, the Republicans, finding it impossible 
129. Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and his Time 
as Shown in his own Letters (New York, 1920], Vol, I, 
p. 96. 
to secure a two-thirds majority in the Senate, had decided 
to use the method of joint annexation which required only 
a majority in each house. When introduced in this way, 
however, a bill gained no special consideration and had to 
take its chance along with the rest of the business of Con­
gress. It particularly required cooperation from the 
speaker for it was perfectly possible for him to refuse 
opportunity to bring such a resolution before the House. 
Mow it happened that Thomas B. Seed, Speaker of the House, 
was one of the few Republicans from New England who had 
not departed from the standards of his forefathers to em­
brace imperialism. His position as Speaker had prevented 
his taking part in the former debates on the Hawaiian ques­
tion but his stand on the matter was well known. This 
country should "grow up to the territory we have already" 
and try to create a fully united nation, he had written in 
an article on naval affairs. In spite of the protests 
of members of his own party, he opposed the introduction 
of the annexation bill all through April. After the cap­
ture of Manila bay, annexationist sentiment again became 
so strong that Speaker Reed had to give in. The Newlands 
resolution was brought before the House on May 4. Even then, 
130. "The New Navy", Illustrated American, Sept. 25, 1897, 
quoted in William A. Hob in son, Thomas B. Reed, Parlia 
mentarian (New York, 1930), p. 357. 
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lie refused for three weeks to permit a rule for its con­
sideration. On May 24, the Republican members circulated 
a petition requesting: Chairman Grosvenor to summon a 
caucus "to consider the Hawaiian resolution with a view 
to its prompt and speedy consideration and to transact 
such other business as may be necessary." Seeing that 
the question would have to be fought out sooner or later, 
Speaker Reed capitulated and on June 2 it was announced 
that the Hawaiian measure would be passed before the ad­
journment of the House. A few days later unaminous con­
sent was given to Mr. Hitt*s resolution to set aside the 
order of business on June 11 and proceed with the Hawaiian 
debate until June 15 when a vote should be taken. Thus 
began the first great Congressional debate over "manifest 
destiny" in its modern sense of economic imperialism. 
Chairman Hitt of the House Committee on Foreign Rela­
tions fired the opening gun. Always a successful pleader, 
he seldom attended the House sessions; except when a ques­
tion concerning our foreign relations was up for considera­
tion. 2̂ How he launched into a powerful support of the 
Administration measure. For many years, he pointed out, 
131. Washington Post, May 24, 25, 26; New York Tribune, June 
2, 1898, quoted in Robinson, op. cit., p. 366, 367. 
132. Shelby M. Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service, Per­
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Hawaii had contemplated union with. America, two voluntary 
attempts having been made in 1851• This being true, the 
question for discussion was whether the Islands were of any 
value to the United States or not. Believing the affirmative, 
Mr. Hitt set out to prove his ease by referring to the 
opinions of such naval experts as Admiral Walker, Captain 
Mahan, General Schofield, Admiral Belknap, General Alexander, 
Admiral Dupont and Chief Engineer Melville. All of these, 
Mr. Hitt said, have testified as to Hawaii's strategic im­
portance in the defense of our Western coast. They believe 
furthermore, that the American possession of Hawaii would 
diminish the necessity for a naval force in the Pacific 
while in the hands of an enemy it would furnish a secure 
base for active operations against our coast. Although 
we have Pearl Harbor, Mr. Hitt continued, no less an autho­
rity than General Schofield, after a three months survey 
decided that we needed the Islands too, to prevent all 
neutral complications. Moreover since the Pearl Harbor 
grant was made in return for reciprocity it would cease 
with the cessation of reciprocity, an event likely to occur 
in case of their annexation by another power. That other 
powers realized their value was evidenced by the represen­
tatives which seventeen nations kept continuously at 
Honolulu as well as by the Japanese protests to the 
United States. The campaign in the Philippines had made 
some action imperative for if we recognized Hawaii's neu­
trality we would lay her liable to damages to Spanish ship­
ping by our use of her ports. Since annexation was really 
not a departure from the established customs of our country 
due to the necessity of our possessing Hawaii for "the de­
fense of our Western shore, the protection and promotion 
of our commercial interests, and the welfare and security 
of our country generally,** the few objections made in re­
gard to race, leprosy, etc. were negligible, Mi*. Hitt con­
cluded. 
He was answered by three powerful anti-annexationists, 
the first being Mr. Hugh Dinsmore of Arkansas, who said he 
hoped the debate would not become a partisan affair. Al­
though previously favoring annexation, Mr. Dinsmore con­
fessed that his study of the question had made him its 
opponent. In the first place, he contended, we have no 
constitutional authority to take Hawaii except as a terri­
tory to be admitted as a state, an utterly impossible pro­
cedure. In the second place, there is no necessity for our 
espousal of a colonial policy—a step which would involve 
us in practically every European controversy that occurred 
over territory. In the third place its loss would not be 
a calamity as we could use our coaling station at Unalaska, 
133. Cong. Rec. Vol. XXXI, Part 6, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., 
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while its acquisition would undoubtedly require a navy in 
1 ̂ 4. the Pacific and fortifications on our Western coast. 
Champ Clark next took up the attack on the imperialists 
and struck some strong blows in his party's behalf. Ho 
real gain will come from such a step, he said, for it is 
not like our past acquisitions of territory—it is not 
open to development. The reason this proposition is being 
pushed so hard is because $5,000,000 of Hawaiian bonds 
have been sold in this country at about thirty cents on 
the dollar and annexation will guarantee their payment. 
Furthermore, if admitted as a state, Hawaii will have 
two senators and a representative whose votes the Republi­
cans need, also three electoral ballots which McKinley 
will need in 1900. If Hawaii is annexed, our colonial 
policy will have commenced. A bill has already been 
introduced by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to purchase the 
islands of St. Hiomas, St. Croix, and St. John, and many 
here are talking of annexing Puerto Rico, the Philippines, 
the Canaries, and the Caroline islandsr135 
"This annexation scheme is in flagrant viola­
tion of that basic principle of our Republic, for 
many thousand Hawaiians...have solemnly protested 
against the sale and delivery of their country to 
us by a little gand of adventurers who, claiming 
to be the whole thing, are offering us a property 
of which they have robbed the rightful owners." 
134. Cong. Rec. Vol. XXXI, Part 6, 55th Cong. 2d sess., 
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The propaganda these adventurers have openly carried 
on in Washington has been a disgrace and no other govern­
ment on earth would permit the agents of a foreign country 
to come to its capital and interfere openly in its affairs. 
In conclusion, Mr. Clark took a shot at manifest destiny, 
the darling of the annexationists, defining it in the words 
of Rob Roy:-*-3® 
"The good old rule, the simple plan 
That they should take who have the power, 
And they should keep who can." 
The third of the trio for the negative was Henry U. 
Johnson of Indiana. He maintained three propositions, first 
that the acquisition of Hawaii is not necessary as a war 
measure in our conflict with Spain, second, that it is not 
necessary to prevent its falling into the hands cff another 
great power, and third, that Hawaiian annexation is inherent­
ly wrong and an opening wedge to lead to further additions 
of territory. Since Hawaii is not fit to be admitted as a 
state it would have to be governed as a conquered province,, 
a proceeding for which there is no American authority. The 
other colonies which we would seeure, once launched on this 
scheme, would all have to be governed in contravention of 
republican principles with the result that in time of war 
they would become the liability to us that Spain's has been 
136. Cong. Ree., Vol. XXXI, Part 6, p. 5788-5795. 
to her. The whole affair would "be mere presumption on our 
part, Mr. Johnson felt, for any country which supports a 
document like the Monroe Doctrine, has no right to meddle 
T 'Vt 
in Asiatic affairs# 
On June 14, William Sulzer of New York made a speech 
in support of the bill. Up to the present, he told the 
House, the Democrats have always been the annexationists, 
for every increase of national territory except Alaska has 
come under a Democratic administration. Grover Cleveland 
alone opposed this policy in his attempt to restore Liliuo-
kalani, a proceeding not favored by American sentiment. 
The contemplated acquisition would neither be a departure 
from our past policy nor from the Monroe Doctrine as Hawaii 
is a contiguous territory which is necessary to our pre­
servation. In obtaining the Islands we would merely 
emulate the example of European powers who realize that the 
destiny of a nation depends upon its control of markets and 
will step into the Pacific themselves unless we watch our 
rights and protect our interests there. Our first step in 
preservation must be, then, the annexation of Hawaii, the 
key to the whole situation.13® William Hepburn, Mr. Sul­
zer^ colleague, agreed in accusing the Democrats of 
137. Cong. Rec., Vol. XXXI, Part 7, p. 5992-6002. 
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changing sides on the annexation question and read the 
Ostend Manifesto as an example of their former attitude# 
Denying that the possession of Hawaii necessarily com­
mitted us to a eolonial policy, he saw no harm in im­
perialism if it did result. Three legitimate ways of ac­
quiring territory are recognized—by purchase, by conquest, 
and by discovery, he pointed out. Unless we wish defeat 
for our forces, we all hope that Cuba, Puerto Rico, and 
the Philippines will be ours by conquest. No one knows 
exactly what we will do with this territory but we will 
probably retain parts as coaling stations for commerce 
has greatly changed and to-day we must have these friendly 
ports or "drop out of the procession of nations in their 
great effort to capture the commerce of the world". 
The discussion was brought to a close by the taking of 
the vote. The joint resolution of the majority was passed 
by two hundred and nine to ninety one. It was then re­
ferred in the Senate to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
which reported it without amendment on June 17. On June 
20, it came up for consideration. 
The Ohio Republicans had already sounded the keynote 
for the Senate debate by endorsing in their platform "the 
steps now being taken by Congress and the President", and 
139. Cong. 5ec., Yol. XXXI, Part 7, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., 
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by expressing an "urgent wish that the same be fully accom­
plished at the earliest practicable date by the passage by 
the Senate of the joint resolution.Annexationist 
sentiment was so strong that the opposition saw no chance 
of escape unless through "filibustering". Three months of 
deliberation had defeated the Hawaiian bill in the last 
Senate and delay might be successful at this time. In 
general the line of argument resembled that put forward 
in the House. Senator Morrill of Vermont spent much time 
in denouncing the reciprocity treaty of 1875, that "enor­
mous blunder" which was the cause of the present trouble, 
having encouraged the sugar barons to increase their ex­
ports to the United States from twenty six million to 
four hundred forty three million pounds. This treaty 
should have been terminated long ago, he believed, or at 
least modified so as to have remitted not more than ten 
or twenty per cent of the duties. In addition he made a 
strong point of the fact that Hawaii was not fit to become 
a state. Were it annexed, it could never be admitted to 
the Union, he pointed out, for the varied races there would 
never be fit for American citizenship and they could not 
be driven out because their labor is indispensable. The 
alternative, colonial government, is not very inviting ^?hen 
140. The Nation, Yol. LXVI, p. 490. 
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we look at the continuous strife in the colonies of other 
countries,141 Senator Morrill was strongly supported by 
William B. Bate of Tennessee. Senator Bate opposed the 
resolution on two grounds, the policy and the right of an­
nexation. Characterizing the action as an abandonment of 
the Monroe Doctrine and the inauguration of an Oriental 
policy, he denounced such a change on the ground that our 
government was not fitted to administer it. One of the 
first steps would be the creation of a colonial depart­
ment, the second, an increase in the army and navy# This 
great change would come as a result of a movement of 
doubtful constitutionality, adopted because of its ex­
pedience. "The entering wedge to a series of troubles in 
our country which could not be controlled...in after 
years," it might result in the control of our government 
142 by the army, Mr. Bate feared. 
Senator Hoarfs stand as revealed on July 5, differed 
somewhat from that of the majority# The Nation said that 
he was trying to oppose imperialism without cutting loose 
from his party (the Republican) which had recently voted 
almost unanimously for annexation in the House. Then too, 
he did not wish to take issue with the McKinley 
141. Gong. Rec., Vol. XXXI, Part 7, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., 
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administration which was "pushing the scheme with utmost 
14*!? 
zeal*. Not long before speaking, Senator Hoar had had 
a conference with the President in which Mr. McKinley had 
told him of the landing of Japanese emigrants with mili­
tary training at Honolulu and of the evident determination 
of Japan to secure the Islands, He went before the Senate 
144 
therefore, determined to outwit Japan. Mr. Hoar began 
by saying that while he opposed the acquisition of Cuba 
or the Philippines from Spain, the fear of imperialism 
was a needless alarm in the case of Hawaii. This question 
is not one of empire in the Pacific but of how far our 
boundaries shall extend in the Hawaiian islands for we 
already have Pearl Harbor. Having exercised doninion 
over this group for two generations, we now have a rela­
tion to them that no one else can share and their annexa­
tion would be "an extension of the domain of peace upon 
the habitable globe.1* It would not be right to annex 
them in violation of the will of the people Mr. Hoar 
agreed. However, as there has been no attempt to over­
throw their government since the end of Mr. Cleveland*s 
administration, it would seem that they acquiesce in the 
change. The alternative will undoubtedly lead to Japanese 
domination there through immigration, a move which the 
143. The Nation. Tol. LX7II, p. 2. 
144. Hoar, op. eit., Yol. II, p. 507-8. 
96. 
United States could never permit. As "prevention is better 
than cure", a peaceful settlement now is better than a fu­
ture war between America and Asia over the Islands. Yery 
optimistically, Mr. Hoar concluded by propounding a rule 
for solving the "greater and more dangerous problem which 
145 
is upon us in the near future": 
"We will acquire no territory; we will ainex 
no people; we will aspire to no empire or dominion* 
except where we can reasonably expect that the 
people we acquire will, in due time and on suitable 
conditions, be annexed to the United States as an 
equal part of a self-governing republic." 
TIhe Senate by this time had grown weary of the debate 
which was keeping them in Washington during the hot weather. 
On July 6, 1898, they passed the joint resolution by a vote 
of forty two to twenty one, and on July 8, it was approved 
by President McKinley. Bius the sugar planters reaped 
the benefits of a century of American penetration in Hawaii 
and the United States announced to Europe that she too, was 
commencing a career of foreign economic imperialism. 
145. Cong. Rec., Vol. X£XI, Part 7, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., 
p. 6660-6665. 
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